In the Many 2026 edition of Warships International Fleet Review, (on sale in e-version and print in the UK & abroad after 20 April 2026), I argue the surface level arguments about the state of the Royal Navy such as seen in the media and social media, does not come close to reality of the actual peril that Britain’s seapower and its national defences are in.

The full article is available in print and e-print. The publishers website is:

https://warshipsifr.com/

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Historians generally resist speculation—yet this tendency creates a fascinating paradox. The study of past experience offers profound insight for the present and future, and historians are often the first to emphasise just because something is old that it is not neccesarily irrelevant.

The Admiralty’s structure—and how British defence was once organised: through committees rather than centralised management—likely would have prevented the situation where many claim that the Royal Navy under strain, come [terminal] decline.

This invites an exploratory question: if Britain re-established an Admiralty independently or part of a vastly downsized and streamlined Ministry of Defence, what course might it chart for the Royal Navy? Drawing on two decades of my research into organisation and strategy—including long-term study of the Admiralty itself—I can offer some informed speculation.

For this exercise, the latest UK Defence Review will be discarded because it is unfunded, outdated and defence reviews an a foreign import to the British mindset, and the current funding model relatively maintained–although it is universally agreed, an uplift in real terms of the UK defence budget is needed. Also, the reader must be mindful, the Admiralty Board sets the overall direction. How that overall direction is resolved is handed to ‘experienced and trained professionals’ at multiple levels of the organisation. It should be understood, part of the success of the ‘White Ensign’ over centuries was that the Admiralty entrusted civilians and military execute on the tasks given to them, this is called decentralisation. This is an alternative to the approach of recent decades of micromanagement and backseat driving by centralised authority, that includes poorly educated civilian servants.

The Admiralty’s Proposed Framework:

The Admiralty Board, as the ultimate civilian authority over the Naval Staff, would likely direct through these prioritised lenses:

Immediate: Save from terminal decline; stabilise.1

Intermediate: Define actionable plans; resolve blocking issues. Understand timelines. Future planning, shape and scope of the fleet.

Long-Term: Educate against seablindness; rebuild national strategy with the other military service[s].

Direction:

The Admiralty rejects the notion of active choice by decline—both in Britain’s power status and in core strategic principles essential to national defence, prosperity and national success in the future. The navy is central to this imperative. Therefore the following immediate steps need to be take place as a cohesive whole:

The ‘back to basics plan’ for the HM Government and the Naval Staff:

• Restore ammunition stocks

  • Replenish weapons inventory to drive up shipboard combat readiness.

  • Restore frequency of live weapon firing training exercises.

• Revise equipment stocks

  • With limited warships, submarines and aircraft, the management, protection and survivability of those assets is vital.

  • Fit naval assets with defensive and offensive weaponry to protect survivability. Eliminate culture of ‘fitted for but not with’.

  • Investigate logistic chains for parts suppliers.

• Reestablish Greater Asset Presence at Sea

  • Reduction in maintenance times and issues must happen, failure should result in severe penalties.

  • Availability of all naval and maritime assets must be driven up, ensuring a mission capable fleet posture.

  • Restoration of time for sailors in the fleet to engage in training, data gathering on performance analysis by being at sea to reduce gaps in deployable readiness.

  • There is to be emphasis placed on seatime. His Majesty’s ships, submarines and aircraft of the fleet, need to be at sea more, driving the important of ‘experience’ in the suitably qualified and experience personnel of the fleet.

    • History informs us that experience has often been the determining factor or difference in the performance of one navy over another, which cannot be gained anywhere but being at sea.

• Accelerate Naval Asset Delivery

  • Admiralty would work with HMG/Treasury to enable a ‘one for one’ swap, of assets: warships, submarines and aircraft.

  • Delivery of new warships and retirement of old accelerated.

• Abolish the ‘Hybrid Navy’ plan:

  • Faceless and untested technology, including faith in that technology to take the place of more powerful and capable assets is misguided. That less assets but more technologically can counter balance numbers of proven assets, like warships, is out of touch. Technology has always been a factor in warfare.

  • Numbers and availability of warships, submarines and aircraft matter, enable options for HM Government simultaneously near home and further abroad. Rising threat levels demand responses, it should not be left to ‘risk’ where a choice is forced of ‘one threat or another’ where plausible.

  • Those the navy serves, such as the protection of the merchant mariner, wish to see sailors and the White Ensign present, not technology. This is additionally a powerful deterrent to foes and diplomatic power for Britain.

• Eliminate Redundant Planning:

  • Scrapping conceptual waste like ‘Atlantic Bastion’ would yield improvements. Britain’s strategic reality and naval role have changed little; unnecessary academic exercises must give way to practical strategy. History provides the answers, whereas rebrands and new concepts that are a redress of once known things are wasteful. Nor is the naval service a job creation scheme for experimentation when more important matters must be addressed, like the size, reach and scope of the fleet.

  • Operationally, restoring trust with the British public, even if choices are made by HMG, should result in a firm policy of the interception, deterrence or removal of an aggressor, irrelevant of the asset they are using, from British waters [from seabed to space, in partnership with other services].

• Reform of Naval Staff Structure and Naval Personnel:

  • Redistribute focus from theory and management back to focus on the fleet.

  • Value retention of experienced personnel over recruitment of new personnel.

  • Emphasise seagoing/frontline experienced officers and personnel in the upper-echelons of the service.

  • Remove underperforming civil servants and those who made promises who can’t deliver.

  • Permit early retirement for a small group of senior naval/marine officers and civilians who contributed to recent setbacks. Bringing new talent and experience, preferably sea experienced, up from lower levels and providing opportunity for new sailors and marines to gain experience at lower levels.

  • Reassert naval command and control by reallocating Royal Marine talent to investigate the future shape and scope of amphibious capability and ensuring the Commando standard remains world-leading.

    • Should Royal Marines believe they are a land-force than a maritime force they should be removed from the navy’s budget and handed to the army, if not disbanded.

  • Streamline decision-making, a natural process in the restoration of Admiralty.

  • Decentralise command and control to local authorities and those at sea.

  • Significant workload reductions for naval personnel by abolishing schemes, initiatives and programmes that distract them from their main tasks. That being getting ships, submarines and naval aviation at sea, training and gaining experience. Anything else is secondary or deemed irrelevant.

• Admiralty actions or investigations:

  • Admiralty-controlled PR/Comms office to counter misinformation and enable education without straining civil-military trust.

  • There should be no inhibition on valuing pride, heritage and tradition while equally moving with the times but the latter should not undermine the former. Restoration of fighting spirit.

  • Advice to HM Government about various matters such as the protection of shipping, protection of strategic chokepoints, risk adversity, use of naval service outside of NATO and allied frameworks. Realigning the Royal Navy to a British security profile first, followed by strategic alliances second. Reassess threat models and priorities including doctrine and wargaming.

  • Examine PME (Professional Military Education) effectiveness for naval personnel.

  • Investigate integration of other services and their experiences with the naval service and the effectiveness of so called ‘jointness’ at various levels.

  • Examination on the funding model of the nuclear deterrent.

  • Probe joint command integration mechanisms, placement and effectiveness for naval personnel particularly in operations and strategic level decision-making to avoid repeats of recent setbacks.

  • Explore academic relationships and advisory practices including use of institutional knowledge [the study of history, maritime strategy, national strategy and experience] and protection of corporate memory and recent tactical and operational experience. Reassess who has in the past counselled the navy and now who should.

  • Engage with other stakeholders, such as insurance and merchant mariners to assess their concerns and needs. Reassess international law and the impact of AUKUS.

END.

Losing seapower isn’t gradual decline—it’s active abandonment. This analysis examines how Britain systematically relinquished five centuries of maritime defense capability, dislocating national strategy from its geographic core. I challenge prevailing narratives of “managed decline” or simple “fall,” arguing that Britain’s post-2026 reality represents deliberate deconstruction of its seapower. The case study reveals how organizational inertia, technocratic bias, and political indifference can utterly undermine foundational defence principles—proving that geography offers neither safety nor ease, only non-negotiable survival demands. For scholars of national security, maritime strategy, or post-imperial defense, this examination exposes the sharp tension between historical reality and contemporary policy rhetoric.

In my 2021 PhD, ‘Deconstructing the Seapower State: Britain, America and Unified Defence’ I predicted the end of Britain as an seapower, stating:

“Over the best part of five centuries, it was understood by some that seablindness is like a weed which needed to be pruned else could grow into a fatal cancer. If it was let out of control or the right circumstances aligned; they knew the eventual end of British strategy & seapower was inevitable for both are one and the same.”

The foretold end of Britain as a seapower began to emerge some time ago: with plenty warnings and ‘off ramps’ available. Since then, some have wrongly labelled it ‘fall and decline,’ while others call it ‘managed decline.’ Increasingly after the 1960s, understanding of seapower was purposefully reconfigured away from an understanding of the experience of how Britain developed the only national strategy it could. But Britain being a seapower is no more about foreign policy, the role of Britain in the world, defence asset numbers, or even resources than it is about anything else. It begins with geography and five centuries of how Britain [England] has defended itself.

More fundamentally, British national strategy begins not with abstract conversation but with objective reality. Britain has always had one core defensive imperative: protecting its island home. This isn’t optional—it’s the very foundation of ‘national security’.

British national defence strategy isn’t complicated––as many would lead you to believe for various nefarious reasons—it’s simply what British seapower entails: a non-negotiable maritime core to defence that addresses the harsh realities of being an island. Britain has no choice in its national defence strategy, because it always had to address maritime commitments, near and far from home, that were directly about the security of the nation. This has and should always be the charter of the island lands.

The real story is often reversed but the truth is conversations about defence of the island realm come first, before any discussions about broader strategic or foreign policy objectives. Geography demands a specific kind of military approach coupled with the fact that Britain has never had meaningful choices about its defence posture—it’s been constrained by its very existence as an island nation.

Since King Henry VIII founded the Royal Navy, few moments have seen decision-makers so consciously struggle with national defence: sometimes their hand forced, other times not so, equally, defence is not shielded from domestic issues. Domestic politics often forced hands, yet even when not, defence remained vulnerable to political neglect. What emerges is a consistent pattern: island security requires constant attention, never taken for granted. Yet through these trials, one truth persisted: when a foreign power threatened Britain, or issues arose or even internal crises emerged, island survival demanded more than rhetoric and was acted on.

Yet, history shows even broken and impoverished, England understood that when a foreign power threatened them or issues arose, island survival demanded more than rhetoric— It required a non-negotiable maritime core—defence from invasion, securing resource lines to sustain the population, and preventing subjugation or manipulation of a nation that had made and cherished self-government than falling into the tyranny of an foreign power [or alike]. A duty for all time, renewed and refreshed to reflect the times and what technology enabled. This is the price islands must pay to protect themselves before they even think about anything else.

2026 is truly a historical marker for the White Ensign and global military history. 2026 represents more than a date—it marks the point where Britain ceases to be a seapower. Without the ability to protect shipping lanes, choke points, fuel depots, or seabed resource areas; without control over Atlantic and Mediterranean passages; without the maritime programme that has defined British defence for five centuries—Britain is effectively declaring: “We do not care what once Kings, Queens, Parliament, Governments, and the public once understood: how Britain would be defeated”—and not necessarily directly by enemy fire. Whether through destitution or neglect, the nation ultimately sacrifices its future by not being realistic to the facts of just how delicate island economies, the cost of living and defence of a way of living stands.

The reality includes Britain’s only attack submarine based in Australia, naval assets idle while bases remain vulnerable, citizens abroad unprotected, and critical economic and security infrastructure exposed. Shipping travels unprotected; fuel lines and data pipes remain unguarded as a defence budgets prioritized imagery over substance. Warships proven capable of defending bases and civilian and military assets from air attack, protecting cargo ships, and securing food and energy processing facilities sit inert.

These are not accidents. They represent conscious choices about national security. A conscious choice to ignore centuries of experience. Hard power swapped for soft words and alliances undermined. The tradition of a navy and nation that acts, trashed. The lack of warships at sea undermines insurance, finance and trust let alone the taxpayer who asks a navy to be at sea not in port. The war with Iran, led by the United States, has exposed what many have warned about for sometime on the state of Britain’s Navy and illiteracy of British defence and security, which has been so often been more hot air then substance: the old adage talk is cheap in which to look good, but action is what matters. It should not be ignored Britain’s response to the Red Sea Houthi threat in 2023, was already a warning of the state of thought towards seas and threats to shipping, energy supplies and the global economy, all of which an island is vulnerable to.

Those wise, will not gloat at the situation but realise what this means, for the Royal Navy remains the undisputed naval fighting force by battle honours in history. Many other navies have taken inspiration, worked closely with, and grown alongside it, intellectually and practically to the benefit of global security. After all, the world should not ask one nation to bear the responsibility of all security on and from the sea. A sense of gratitude must be elevated to the steadfastness of the US Navy whose sailors, marines and intellectuals remain deeply connected with England’s, in more way than one.

Blame often falls on government. The reality, that I have researched, is there are many moving parts of how Britain got from A to B to C. But remember: civilian decision-makers can only act if educated, unless other reasons exist for them to avoid the insight of experience for after all, experience is all humans have. Instead look to advisors—both within and outside government—who hold answers of how Britain abandoned seapower. Unified defence: the UK Ministry of Defence, equally has a leading role in this failure. That is a story for another time, but few will admit accountability, hiding behind excuses. But they failed to understand the responsibility inherited from the past, by what it means to defend an island. Just because it is an old plan, doesn’t mean it’s irrelevant particularly when the receipts proved that a national defence strategy with maritime at its core works in which to address the unique needs of island, ignoring the temptation of land-think that drives continental countries to defend themselves differently.

For the Royal Navy, the circle is somewhat complete: a stain on its reputation, one not of their making yet will take the political ‘flak and ire of the public’. That they have not acted, even with the limited resources they have—an active choice by successive governments to reduce—only serves to prove the point of the fools who have sought to undermine national defence strategy and seapowers centrality to the island because now when protection and action is asked for, where are thou Royal Navy? Arguably something that has not happened before in the services history to such an extent. Navies want to give decision-makers options—and be known as "doing." Because no one can see what they're doing so they have to be known to be doing else the cycle of policy blindness towards them just deepens. In short: the end of Britain as a seapower is a series of smaller problems, over a long period amounting to an end state where few can track the origins of all the issues: classic deconstruction.

The sad reality for Britain and the world, is that Britain has some of the finest military personnel and defence intellectuals on offer, but government only had to be educated, a few who only had to pick up the book and read about how an island nation can be defended and has been successfully for generations. It’s not complicated when you inherit such wisdom from forebears who learned about it the hard way, developed the strategy from that difficulty and executed it. They also knew maritime included all-service participation with a naval core, one not blindly following theories of domain power which mean’t as technology evolved that the strategy stayed the same but the tools could be refreshed.

Those nations who understand the influence of the sea on national life, and the interconnectivity of seabed to space, as Britain once did, will defend and operate at sea with confidence and determination to the benefit of their security and prosperity.

The end of British seapower remains one of the finest case studies of the difficult relationship between organisation, policy, politics, agenda, and strategy—and of how unelected technocrats, bureaucrats, elites, and lawyers either believe they know better, have a different agenda, refuse to be educated, or simply refuse to listen to the easily accessible wisdom of history.

Either way, the Royal Navy did not ‘rise and fall’, nor was it ‘managed decline’, nor was seapower’s fate tied to Britain’s place in the world, its power status or Empire, it was actively deconstructed. This is where we are today: a day of reckoning.

In short, I revisit some arguments in my PhD and forthcoming title:

The myth of an American maritime “spirit”

The notion of an organic American maritime “spirit” is largely misrepresentative. Why?

This stems from a persistent assumption—also deeply flawed in much American naval thinking—that the United States can develop maritime argumentation through naval power alone and be by default a maritime nation. The concept implies some intrinsic capacity to be and think maritime, something few nations possess. Island states have relative advantages here; continental powers are often inherently skeptical or even hostile to the sea as they can retreat to land and have core security [food and fuel] without dependency on the sea, irrelevant of the prosperity that trade and more, that the oceanic forums enable for better or worse, which is a secondary matter.

American naval ambition is reactive, not organic.

American naval ambition hasn’t been spontaneous. It followed specific impetus:

• Beating the British and not just at war.

  • These are two different navies, and although the Royal Navy became subservient to the USN in the 20th century, the USN was never going to ‘best’ the RN in culture or spiritually because they exist for different reasons.

• Securing recognition of the US as maturing global power.

• Waging total war.

• Supporting American foreign policy objectives an era of super power and great power competition.

This isn’t an organic maritime spirit. Most of the time, American sea power has been a naval response to a naval question. This is far from an integrated maritime nation where every component—legal, inland seaways, business, enterprise, shipbuilding, naval, and more—aligns with culture, to work together. Shipbuilding has to be competitive globally, maritime products edgy, mariners trained and international laws influenced, rather than blindly accepted particularly when they tilt against good order at sea, if not against the ‘West’. The age of a happy world at sea, and trust of equals at sea through legal cooperation at sea that Britain and America wanted that came out of the Second World War, is dead, if not a fallacy either nation told itself in the first place.

In the past, America has been a maritime nation, but it is far from it today. Simply put, the concept of America is maritime nation and always has been is disingenuous to the truth and undermines the ability to think clearly about America’s navy and a broader American maritime future let alone a strategy of how the sea is going to influence what happens next. To be blunt, those peddling this myth, are part of the problem. Equally, teaching naval personnel–midshipman to Admiral–and civilians that America is a maritime nation or ‘inherently so’, isn’t helping the situation because they are effectively being duped into a false sense of security rather than being equipped to communicate who they are and what they are for. Education on the sea is a constant task, civilian and military must always be addressing it.

Attempts are underway, but actions, not just assertions, will determine whether a return happens at all, is short lived or longer lasting and this means uncertainty. Achieving true maritime national status requires vast support and significant investment across multiple fronts. It can’t resort to island arguments. This is which why in America naval matters get priority over maritime and civilian, but to be a maritime nation, this imbalance can’t last. It is also something that has accelerated the switch back from America being a maritime nation to a nation with a vast Prussian style tactical naval force.

The shifting dynamics at sea—real competition—notably civilian and military—suggest America’s naval advantage may be retreating, though this could itself generate impetus. It’s not the first time this has happened and plenty examples exist over the 19th and 20th century. Equally, consider the US Navy’s rebuilt strength after Pearl Harbor: astonishing resilience when pressed against the figurative seawall. Could America do it again? Afterall American naval ambition and enterprise, was something a wise Japanese Admiral observed and knew Imperial Japan’s fate was sealed by pretending to be a fake land power. An irony, the Royal Navy’s post-imperial decline directly corresponds to the biggest disaster in British defence: becoming continental minded and a fake land power. For American’s this is all you need to know why the Royal Navy is as weak as it is and how Britain discarded hundreds of years of institutional memory and corporate experience in one of the best national strategy’s the world has seen.1

But returning to America, it is critical to acknowledge, the naval advantage at sea was eroded largely from within the Western framework than outside pressure. Let us not permit those responsible for much of these outcomes escape accountability and equally, all the strain for keeping the peace at sea, or worse, fall entirely on the USN’s shoulders. Where are the other navies that were once part of great and powerful seagoing alliances?

Federal coordination to be a maritime nation remains theoretically possible, but it is also an all American enterprise right across the nation, though bureaucracy—often the genuine adversary of effective maritime and national strategy—will likely sabotage implementation. The deeper reality demands more than rhetoric; it requires sustained political commitment to rethinking America’s relationship with the seas with the USN just part of a picture, not the whole. Yes American navalists, this isn’t all about you and your shopping lists for naval procurement.

This framing obscures a deeper reality. As a continental nation, America has always required deliberate, sustained effort to be both a naval power and maritime power. US historical performance suggests oscillating fall and decline isn’t speculative but somewhat inevitable—making defensive navigation far more critical than patriotic assumptions about inherent seagoing competence in the minds of decisions-makers and lawmakers, let alone the US citizen: who has to fund it.

The core problem: Refusal to accept reality

The real issue remains that Americans refuse to accept a fundamental truth: its relationship with the seas has been “rather up and down,” and the Navy’s fate has often reflected those fluctuations. This volatility is somewhat natural for a vast landmass.

But the “sentimental drivel” of claiming America is a maritime nation—let alone that ghostly spirits of the past will easily carry forth to new glorious heights? That’s nothing more than navalism and misguided pride dressing up genuine difficulty in articulating what the US Navy actually needs or should do. It’s perfectly natural for a nation like the US to struggle with this, and that’s precisely why navalism itself exists but equally why navalism won’t go far enough to address it.

Until many acknowledge this, change will be reluctant and incomplete. It’s always been hard for America to be a sea power—it’s tough, grueling work that requires constant effort on multiple fronts. Quaint ideas and patriotic views are potent, but they cannot defeat the overarching problem. For serious strategists, this means nuance trumps nostalgia. The “maritime spirit” narrative serves more than analysis; it exposes genuine difficulty in articulating what the Navy actually needs and the interconnecting ligaments across the maritime sector and how it may survive into the future. The greatest cynic could see a future of a US Coast Guard, Army and Air Force: just as CNO King and SECDEF James Forrestal feared as they were forced to walk into the army built Pentagon building at the dawn of the defence unification era just after the Second World War having narrowly avoided the Department of War totally dominating the emerging Department of Defense….As Forrestal warned: the temptation for America and its navy to be ruled by an Army War Department, was an constant threat to American maritime power and one hard for America to resist nor dressing American naval strategy as ‘maritime strategy’ in an effort to convince America it was maritime. Cold War warriors take heed from King and Forrestal if you can bring yourself to accept this reality.

Why this refusal to see reality is particularly dangerous

To tip the scales of seablindness to disaster rather than something manageable—in island and continental nations–is usually due to lacklustre performance of continental thinking applied to the sea which infects thinking, debate and conversations towards a naval paradigm then a maritime one: distorting policy, destroying strategy and creating bigger problems for later.

Confusion steams on if America is a maritime nation from the geographic realities of America, flanked by two oceans: in short to go anywhere or do anything on mass, needs the naval and maritime component. Whereas, other nations, islands or those on continental land masses can clearly see their defence priorities: land and air together, or a maritime core to their strategy. That means Army and Air Force or, for others, a navy and expeditionary army. Either way, the culture of a continent overrides sound thinking on this, how the people feel safe, as we see in America is because of the lack of sea dependency which drives a paradox on exactly what the shape and scope of naval ambition and being maritime is.

A historical pattern

Again, many of our forebears on both sides of the Atlantic knew this. What makes this conversation urgent is its historical consistency. British and American figures from Washington, Adams, Mahan, Corbett, Sims, Knox, King, Forrestal, Burke, and others recognised these tensions, reflecting the times they operated. But today, it seems many either aren’t educated to understand it, refuse to study it, or lack the objective reality to confront it.

The narrative that America possesses an innate maritime character—from cultural DNA to strategic instinct—is widely held yet fundamentally flawed. Continental impulses will always override maritime ones in a vast land mass, like the US. Face this reality and make it the first priority, or in simple terms, fighting seablindness, and there are no limits for the US navy and the maritime sector to excel, from seabed to space.

Corbett 100 began in 2019, identifying key gaps in Corbett’s legacy: his historical works remained accessible but underexplored, his personal records were dispersed, and his strategic methodology needed contemporary refinement. The project aimed to secure and digitalize primary sources, commission a substantive biography, update his seminal texts for modern readers, and systematize his applied history approach for military and strategic studies.

Initial phases included intensive collaboration with archival institutions and military communities, where Corbett’s influence had long been recognized—incorporated into curricula and referenced by professionals across generations. Global conferences then became dynamic platforms, bringing together hundreds of participants including historians, veterans, and military personnel. These gatherings generated substantial scholarly output, with numerous papers and panels exploring Corbett’s enduring relevance to contemporary strategic challenges.

Professor Andrew Lambert writes:

Corbett 100, launched in 2019, is a high impact seapower and maritime strategy forum named for British strategic theorist and historian Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922), the pre-eminent analyst of maritime power, both historical and contemporary. Not only did Corbett have significant links with KCL, including delivering major lectures in the Great Hall, but the revival of intellectual engagement with his work interest began at KCL in the 1970s, in the Dept. of War Studies in where Professor Bryan Ranft made Corbett’s work a core element of the curriculum, republished Corbett’s core text Some Principles of Maritime Strategy of 1911, and supervised a series of doctoral students, alongside his leading role in defence Education at the Royal Naval Staf College, and providing contemporary analysis of the rising Soviet Navy to the Royal Navy. Ranft’s work also laid the foundations for the creation of the Joint Services Defence College, the subsequent privatisation of advanced level defence by KCL. War Studies has expanded that role in the subsequent decades, with a significant focus on global maritime strategic issues, contemporary and historical as major elements in and postgraduate taught programmes and research degrees. War Studies is universally recognised as the centre of excellence in this field, recruiting a significant body of international students and scholars. Corbett emphasised that relevant strategic thinking for the future had to be built on a combination of theory and national experience, using historical case studies to master the key elements of British practice before publishing his core text.

The objects of the founding group were and remain to link contemporary practitioners and analysts, historians and defence educators, to support and promote the latest academic research through international conferences, of which there have four to date, initially at KCL, then in the Australia Defence Forces Academy, the United States Naval War College and the Ecole de la Marine in France. This truly global academic project has established a key role in linking defence academics, historians, and military educators across the world, to facilitate intellectual exchange and promote understanding. The success of the initial round of conferences has generated an research group come network, which will continue to develop research and discussion on the critical role of maritime, rather than merely naval strategy, a critical distinction that Corbett emphasised. He demonstrated that Britain was (and remains) a globally engaged maritime strategic/economic operator in a world dominated by continental military polities, a distinction that remains critical to contemporary policymakers and historians. Corbett’s place as a critical figure in the evolution of British and more general maritime strategic thought has been emphasised, a critical contribution to current debates on preparing for future challenges and conflict. The relevance of Corbett 100 is clear from the fact that the signatories of the AUKUS agreement have each hosted a Corbett 100 event. This marks a significant shift of emphasis from previous strategic assessments.

The directors of the Corbett 100 project are Professor Andrew Lambert, (KCL), Dr James E. Smith (KCL), Dr Mark Bailey RAN, and Professor David Kohen, United States Naval War College. Three of them have Ph.Ds from the War Studies Department.

In only seven years Corbett 100 has made a major impact on global approaches to maritime strategy, intimately linked to the sustained engagement in development of academic naval history. Key outputs from Kings staff will be submitted to the upcoming REF exercise, notably Andrew Lambert, The British Way of War: Sir Julian Corbett and the battle for a national strategy, Yale University Press, London 2021, Selected works from Dr James WE Smith, and elsewhere titles such as David Kohnen, King’s Navy: Fleet Admiral Ernest J King and the Rise of American Sea Power, 1897-1947.

From Corbett 100 to the Corbett Project

The future of Corbett 100 is the overarching, Corbett Project. The future is focused on a Corbett publication and the Corbett forum. Both are detailed below.

Corbett Papers

Professor Andrew Lambert and Dr James WE Smith have moved at pace to complete important archival and record keeping activities with all of Corbett’s [and related] paperwork. This has included working with the UK National Maritime Museum Greenwich, various Societies and King’s College London.

To that end, papers held by King’s College London are now permanently on display and protected in the Liddell Hart Archives, Strand, London. This includes expanded naval collections across the College library and archives.

Digitalisation of Corbett’s paperwork are somewhat complete and due to various legalities remain under ‘the care of’ the Laughton-Corbett Research Fellow [Dr James WE Smith].

Since, the project began, further papers of Sir Julian’s have been found and acquired which will need to have the ‘same treatment’ applied to them as the aforementioned. Some of them, having never been seen before, will go towards informing publications before they enter the public domain.

Codifying Corbett 100

Corbett 100 has generated substantial content across conferences, publications, and diverse media platforms. The project systematically curates and preserves the most valuable contributions for current and future readers.

Central to this work is an upcoming edited volume produced by the Corbett Committee. This publication serves dual roles: functioning as an official “Corbett Proceedings” record while also serving as an educational resource that advances dialogue about his work and legacy. Contributors from global academic, military and professional communities explore these themes, examining both foundational principles and evolving interpretations of maritime strategy, offer insight from historical case studies, and explore the enduring contributions of Corbett’s work to the 21st century.

Corbett Project Events

We will continue to run select international events in online, in person through seminars or lectures as appropriate. This may included gatherings of Corbett minded scholars from the network of the Corbett Forum, or focused events such as book launches or arranged along timely questions or themes.

The Corbett Forum

The Corbett Forum which is the next step in the project as a result of this series of conferences. This is intended to be a loose affiliated international network of scholars with an interest in seapower and maritime strategy. The conferences, seminars and events was an array of international events networking thinkers and practitioners. It was also a test of international networking. A scholarly interest in seapower in general and in Sir Julian Corbett’s work on the philosophy of seapower and maritime strategy are central.

The intent of the cycle of work conducted by the Corbett 100 group has been to expose the continued relevance of Corbett to the 21st century. The workshop in 2025 at the Ecole Navale again proved this relevance, such as the importance of the Indo-Pacific.

As a part of the outcomes of this series of events, we are forming The Corbett Forum. This is intended to be an informal, loosely collaborative network to keep scholars and practitioners informed of our general lines of research for mutual assistance and to prevent duplication of effort. Members will be encouraged to network and mutually assist with:

1. relevant strategic developments in our respective countries and other matters of interest,

2. fostering exchange of information and ideas,

3. assisting each other collegially where possible, building networks, and

4. preventing duplication of research.

We will execute this through a private LinkedIN Group and a Newsletter. For protection of data the ‘Secretary’, one of the committee in conjunction with King’s College London keeps a database of scholars to support that network.

If you are interested please contact me.

Small selection of further reading:

• Book (2021) | The British Way of War: Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy | Andrew Lambert

• Journal Vol CX (2022), Issue 3 | The [UK] Naval Review Corbett 100 Edition | UKNR

  • Thinking about Seapower | Andrew Lambert

  • Some Principles of Maritime Strategy Making in the Royal Navy Today | Kevin Rowlands

  • War in Ukraine: Strategically What Would Have Corbett Said? | Geoffrey Till

  • Corbett 100: A Long Hard Look in the Mirror | James WE Smith

• Paper [2022] | Re-learning from Corbett: Applied History to the rescue of Strategic Thought | James WE Smith

• Paper [2025] | A Future for British Seapower and the Royal Navy | James WE Smith

• Paper [2025] | Learning from the Royal Navy: Lessons for the USN on Sea Power Politics | James WE Smith

• Online Seminar [2023] | Corbett and the Imperial Japanese Navy | Hiraku Yabuki

• Online Seminar [2022] | Sir Julian Corbett as a Historian, Educator, and Strategic Thinker | Defence Studies Department / JSC Shrivenham

• Online Seminar [2021] | The British Influence Upon American Visions of ‘Sea Power’ and History | David Kohnen

• Podcast [2021] | Sir Julian Corbett, Jutland and the Concept of ‘Decisive’ Battle, and the educational value of experience.| Andrew Lambert

• Also see Australian Naval Institute publications.

From the Red Sea’s trade routes to Whitehall’s policy frameworks and into classroom curricula, a persistent issue emerges: seablindness, and now, it is breaking the Royal Navy. Land-centric thinking in Britain has repeatedly undermined national strategy, where maritime strategy is its core, leaving tactical competence decoupled from strategic vision.

Over the past twenty years, I’ve dedicated thousands of hours, acquired academic qualifications, and invested significant financial resources to examine how organization shapes strategic thinking and action. My focus has been on understanding the relationship between structure and behaviour—essentially, whether organizations can achieve desired outcomes. In the defence context, this distinction isn’t theoretical: it determines winning from losing. At the heart of my work is a world view, one of Planet Ocean than Planet Earth. How we perceive our world drives every strategic decision. The maritime perspective leads to a specific analysis: understanding phenomena collectively called “seablindness.”

Over the past decade, I’ve been disseminating findings through multiple channels. The “Art of Admiralty”1 approach emphasizes one thing first: communicating and educating about the seas becomes paramount. More directly, I’ve explored the actual reality of “seablindness”—understanding that while it cannot be vanquished, it can be tackled systematically. Alongside this, I’ve highlighted the practical and theoretical obstacles navies routinely encounter when genuinely addressing this challenge. You can read my summary from 2024 ‘Seablindness and the Royal Navy’, elsewhere I addressed differences between Britain and America including other nations on this matter through professional publications like the UK Naval Review. More recently, I explained what the endgame for seablindness is.

This article looks ahead to 2025 and beyond, examining urgent concerns about the Royal Navy and its persistent struggle with seablindness. I recommend you read at least the 2024 article as a primer before this one. However, what emerges is a genuinely grim assessment—one that must be told.2^[1]

What Naval Message?

“Silent Service” was always more than a nickname—it belonged to the submarines branch culture of secrecy. Yet it would be appropriate to extend the label to the whole naval service. Making visibility central to tackling ‘seablindness’ means acknowledging that navies work away from Whitehall and the public. This drives the need to exploit every opportunity to remind them they exist.

The 2025 Cenotaph service—complete with senior naval absence alongside Royal Household presence none of which were in naval uniform—represents a deliberate choice. Across events ranging from religious holidays to national public gatherings, the navy has retreated from visibility. For sailors and marines already battered by average 30% more deployment time, with the same pay, than Army or Royal Air Force [RAF] counterparts, this eroded representation sends a clear message: either the service has fundamentally diminished worth to the nation, or there’s a quiet omission — the navy is now so stretched it can’t afford things other services seemingly can. Visibility serves as a critical weapon against seablindness—especially for forces operating over the horizon. Yet those who claim to be rebuilding the Royal Navy seem still to have failed to grasp this fundamental truth.

This is a genuine chicken-and-egg dynamic emerges: declining conditions and resources affect the service’s ability to operate and do public relations and engagement, which in turn drives further decline. When a service cannot visibly demonstrate its value, political bodies unaware of the real cost become reluctant to fund it. And since beneficiaries cannot immediately perceive tangible benefits, they rarely feel the urgency to protect what matters most.

Royal Marine take over?

With no active four-star Admiral—for the first time in Royal Navy history—alone with the lack of a naval officer holding serious joint command across British defence, the service has broken centuries of tradition: a General leads.

Some might argue that should be the epitaph, the final curtain call. Their cynicism would be well grounded: if ever an analogy of the rejection of maritime strategic thought could be encapsulated, it could be in calling the head of the naval service “general.”

But the Royal Marines are no fools; that’s why they’ve often been given some of the toughest tasks in conventional British and special forces warfare. Yet if the recent cuts to Britain’s amphibious capability—reduced to pretty much zero—have left a chip on the shoulders of Royal Marine officers who now attempt to take over the navy, helping to give the boot to a previous ‘pro fighting seablindness’ First Sea Lord––for various reasons––then they have gone astray. It’s fair to ask, even if the marines reform themselves, how are they going to get into a fight when they are more limited than ever? Most Royal Marines, having been under threat of extinction for some time understand the value of public relations, and therefore should be sensitive to seablindness and naval needs, but these must be mindful of their traditional role, not one of a land force, from influencing their actions with the navy. However, if the marines seek comfort among the other services while the navy continues its own work, they should recall that the British Army has attempted to have the Royal Marines disbanded more than once. More importantly, since 1945 the Admiralty and senior naval leadership in the MoD era have time and again gone out of their way—often at real material cost—to protect Britain’s amphibious fleet and maintain Royal Marine Commando training quality. Institutions like Britannia Naval College, specialised equipment training and more broadly rating (sailor) training have suffered as a result. The charge that naval personnel have not taken marines, or what they uniquely bring as a fundamental part of the navy and broader defence seriously, would be a fundamental lie and stain on the reputation of corps if they believe it. Either way, for right or wrong, there is a theme emerging one of land-centricity that degrades the criticality of events at sea, and the seabed in favour of land operations, something out of step with events past and present on the oceans over the past few years and are now emerging.

Presence and Operational Matters: Land Centricity

This land-centricity in government was already apparent by the lacklustre response to attacks on shipping in the Red Sea in 2023. Educated Governments in the past, understood not just the importance of shipping to Britain as an island nation but also the impact it could have on global security such as through the economic markets. Letting Shipping being unsafe would have been anti-thetical once to Admiralty and government alike. Elsewhere while America3 and France4 openly seize, tankers operating under false flags for Russia, Britain has been reluctant to directly act [seize] bar then to try and ‘shoo away like a bad smell’ hostile actor ships from its waters.5 Power responds to power, and a gentle nudge from a service once versed in making tough choices, is hardly in the tradition of the habit of victory. If enemies at sea are smelling weakness in the White Ensign, the mythos and respect the RN once carried is all but dead. This is something further compounded as its fleet has withdrawn permeant presence entirely from ‘East of Suez’ while struggling to maintain presence in the Atlantic and Mediterranean: anyone who has bothered to study 500 years of British history, knows is vital for the RN to keep these secure. It’s hardly a global presence: ambition, reality and warship maintenance programmes seem to have been all disconnected in the minds of some.

In response to sustained attacks on merchant shipping, the Royal Navy deployed HMS DIAMOND, a Type 45 destroyer, to the southern Red Sea in late December 2023. The ship arrived formally in early January 2024 and immediately integrated with United States Naval Command and allied forces. Over subsequent weeks, DIAMOND achieved multiple engagements, successfully shooting down hostile Houthi unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The operation generated significant morale enhancement within the Royal Navy and reinforced confidence in the Type 45 air-defence systems. Recognizing the need for expanded protection, the navy ordered rapid augmentation. With no other immediately available Type 45 ships, HMS RICHMOND, a Type 23 frigate, underwent expedited re-tasking. Originally assigned to anti-submarine warfare operations in the North Atlantic and scheduled to join Britain’s Carrier Strike Group 25’s deployment, RICHMOND transitioned in short to open-ocean merchant ship escort. A useful reminder of the flexibility of well configured frigates––take note America. Differential performance emerged between the two vessels’ air-defence systems which was useful information. Either way, both ships spent months operating within high-threat environments. Prolonged periods at elevated readiness states: constant defense watches and action station became normal practice, granting ships companies with essential practice time, insight, data which is worth its weight in gold, when navies often fall short of having such experience: arguably some of the last times this type of experience was granted was in the 1982 Falklands War. This enabled changes across the fleet, honing experience into useful, practice improvements to systems, training and more. However instead of Britain maintain its presence, RICHMOND completed its tour and returned to UK waters by early May 2024. DIAMOND followed later.

No Royal Navy frigate or destroyer subsequently replaced these vessels in the region. The next meaningful RN presence materialized with Carrier Strike Group 25’s transit in summer 2025—a full calendar year later. The deployments remained notable for their rapid deployment characteristics, operational flexibility, and the practical insights gained through direct engagement with modern aerial threats. By comparison: The United States maintain a continuous, multi ship presence across the region. American surface ships view the southern Red Sea through a dual lens: as both a mission zone for merchant ship protection and as a deliberate training environment. Since the establishment of sustained Houthi threats, the US Navy has systematically cycled its ships through regional deployments. These missions expose sailors to real-environment operations. A distinctive feature of US Navy operations is the deliberate spreading of combat experience. By rotating ships through engagements, the service creates a distributed but credible experience base. This approach could yield significant value for potential conflicts in the South China Sea or around Taiwan within the next five years.

Other European navies demonstrate different approaches to regional presence. French, Italian, and Greek forces maintain consistent frigate and destroyer deployments. While their engagements remain less frequent to US operations, ships companies develop substantial practical expertise through prolonged, intensive interactions with adversaries.

A question remained: if this was a chance to test new systems and for sailors to gain experience that could contain great value for the future, why did the White Ensign essentially retreat?

The morale impact on the rest of the RN cannot be discounted. The work of DIAMOND and RICHMOND electrified the officer and rating cadres had been in the fight and had acquitted themselves well––in the highest traditions of the service. Subsequently an intriguing case study emerges from HMS DUNCAN’s 2024 Eastern Mediterranean deployment. The ship remained in the Eastern Mediterranean and did not transit into the Red Sea. Officers anecdote suggests this positioning was deliberate: DUNCAN maintained readiness to support a potential Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) from Lebanon. Importantly, it would have helped take pressure of a strained US Navy which has too much placed on it already by lacklustre commitment of some nations to step up at sea.

The decision appears linked to organizational biases. Army officers, particularly since the 2021 Kabul evacuation, demonstrated heightened NEO preparedness come paranoia and have advised government to this, particularly when they hold positions of senior command over all British forces. The fault to not cycle more British frigates and destroyers through the Red Sea was jointly an operational level and reality that the Royal Navy is so short on assets, it can’t meet the demands required of it––blame successive cuts which at their root, is seablindness. Go anywhere outside the UK and North Atlantic, UK forces come under CJO’s Operational Command (OPCOM) from PJHQ, army officers’ rule here who in this case had little care for training sailors in a real world environment but turned their eyes to land events—which notably, did not occur.

The fall of Kabul triggered changes in military training priorities that persisted through early 2024. A consistent pattern emerged: army and Royal Marine leadership became primary architects of NEO doctrine, again, remove from core British needs. Exercises shifted to emphasize evacuation procedures, with staff teams spending significant time planning hypothetical saves. Differences in training intensity became apparent. UK Commando Forces conducted a January 2024 exercise focused entirely on NEO planning for a Philippines scenario involving hurricane damage and regional tension. Parallel high-intensity scenarios—such as Royal Marines transiting across a contested North Sea or landings in northern Norway—remained unrealizable for the 1* staff. That real experience against UAV’s and alike was deprioritised in a world where, in Ukraine, Asia and elsewhere, technologies such as this are moving to the centre ground, speaks volumes. This suggests selective operational validation where high intensity warfare, something sailors need experience in urgently was an afterthought and this shone through in the management in the Red Sea situation.

Some of this can be debated in professional circles, but it exposes that Britains navy is too stretched. For all the talk of hybrid navies, the reality is presence, capability and power counts and that means hulls in the water. However more importantly, the Red Sea situation exposed exactly that, the naval service is lacking experience. This is because there wasn’t a hand on the tiller with the authority to do it when it should have and others turned a blind eye to the sea and naval service. Those who have read more of my work, will know my investigation into the strengths and weaknesses of unified defence––the monolithic organisations like the UK Ministry of Defence–– read in “Endgame for Seablindness”6 I said the next step in unified defence was necessary but it had to acknowledge some things needed to be reversed. An army general, lacking the knowledge of running naval service demonstrates there is a limit to so called ‘jointness’. The point where operational jointness––forgo the rhetoric on reducing inter-service rivalry, it was a lie in the 1960s to help the Treasury case, and it still is now––undermines the quality of service emphasises how unified defence is not working. It is not centralisation that is needed but decentralisation of authority to avoid exactly the type of situation the Red Sea demonstrated. Britain needs to empower its service chiefs, not seek bland solutions disconnected from the ‘frontlines’. In short, one must be mindful the MoD was build at a land-centric ministry, in service to the treasury, hence, taxpayers must seek refuge and trust in the military to manage themselves not a MoD that produced better defence reviews with 500 staff in the 1950s, compared to now with over 90,000.

British ‘Naval’ Thinking: Or, What Actually Is It?

The amount of energy required to now refute the drivel, technobabble, terminology ridden gobbledegook and nonsense of the land-centric thinking that all services have had to endure, is an order of magnitude bigger than to produce it. British military doctrine has been profoundly shaped by concepts like “warfighting”—a word strikingly absent from Oxford dictionary–– yet evidently adopted from continental traditions. Island nations that treat possessing a “warfighting capability” as if it guarantees security reveal genuine confusion over strategy, again exposing unified defence is a land-centric school of thought not a maritime one. The persistent promotion of this framework suggests more than accident: the takeover of British defence by land-focused thinkers has over time forced the British military in a position which now every day is bringing it into question of it can defend Britain. An irony, that embracing tales told by idiots, full of sound and fury but nothing of substance, has broken British defence: exactly as the Admiralty in 1961 predicated would happen. Some equally may called this land-centricity the “The Continental Commitment” but it goes beyond that and is probably one of the worse things to befall British defence, something growing since at least 1914–I will not cover that here.7 Either way, the question is whether this will ultimately leave Britain defeated when theory collides with reality.

Elsewhere, by the end of the 20th century, British academics had become deeply embroiled in debates concerning the methodology, conceptual meaning, and practical application of seapower and maritime strategy—issues spanning the Navy’s future structure and theoretical foundations. Two schools emerged with prominence: first, the “Navalism and Sea Power” tradition, systematically advanced by Professor Geoffrey Till through PME (Professional Military Education). The other, Professor Andrew Lambert’s approach—the “civilian department”—which continued what had become known as the “Corbettian” school of applied history and maritime strategy philosophy. In Britain, the dependency on external defence educators and historians is how, generally, at least for navies, much thinking has been done, for all its benefits and a few detractors. To say the students of either school had not clashed would be a misunderstanding. It may even be the case and may have only muddied the waters with education to those outside the military then already was taking place. When I attempted to disseminate twenty years of research on seablindness––including how to fix it and ‘right the ship’––the response from certain segments of the naval and academic communities would have prompted whispers I was one of the ‘Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse’.8 In fact, a few wrote to my mentor at the College asking me to be silenced. Why such sensitivity when everyone is supposed to be on the same side? Did they really think that twenty years of research, a PhD, and verification of my data by King’s and some of the world’s top historians, military personnel, and defence professionals was suddenly invalid because someone’s feelings had been hurt? This was exactly like when Sir Julian Corbett was given the boot by the Royal Navy in 1920: history reflecting reality was being used to point out failure and what needed changing for the positive, and that did require some constructive criticism and finger-pointing.

The point was that one school, who had become predominate because that ‘educated’ defence civilians and military personnel and therefore ended up in positions of influence, had avoided addressing the first and only issue that mattered: education about the sea and navy. They ignored that for terms like ‘seablindness’ to exist, it can only be seen as a complete failure where things once known and understood yesterday are not known today. Repeating the same tactics since the late 1980s, which have delivered little, is a sign of failing to understand the problem and is akin to madness to continue in this manner. The decline in understanding of seapower, maritime strategy and its interface with national strategy and policy does not occur overnight and will not be solved quickly. How can it be that warnings of the recent past have come to fruition? Why are the fundamental tenants of seapower, naval power or maritime strategy—questions solved by great historians like Corbett—seemingly not understood today in many quarters, particularly by some who should know better or claim they do ‘get it’? What have some been doing all these years, if still government and the public must ask: ‘What is the navy for?” The answer to “What is the navy for?” should have been thrashed out and resolved long ago; it was an easy task for the answers lay in the past, and from that, the answer communicated full volume to those at the highest level of decision-making in the nation. That this was left to linger by some past generations has caused turmoil that cannot be overlooked, particularly by those who present nothing but a negative message about the navy who had an opportunity prior to do something to avoid the situation the service now finds itself. Younger generations should be rightfully frustrated and equally seeking to give those with closed minds and status quo attitudes, the hard boot.

In the past, having the constant capability, institutional knowledge and corporate experience in place to be aware that educating on seapower was a constant task led by civilians to educate others about the sea and navy. Subsequently, it freed naval officers to be the best sea professionals. This was how Britain ended up with the best naval officers like Lord Nelson and quality trained ratings, which ultimately led the Royal Navy to become the successful force that it was. This was also because Britain had no choice regarding its national defence strategy, where officers had to be freed to focus on that task, for failure at sea meant doom for the nation. At the same time, civilians ensured that the Government, Parliament and the public were educated about the Naval Service and why Britain had no choice but to have a maritime strategy. The fact that anti-maritime and anti-naval voices after 1964 could even present to the government the illusion of choice other than maritime strategy or Britain is a ‘land power’ should have been squashed at inception if there was an active naval and maritime system to counter such ridiculous and unfounded claims.

Growing cognitive dissonance appears in terminology like “hybrid navy” and “Atlantic Bastion.” Britain’s naval strategy of locking down the GIUK gap and maintaining control of the Mediterranean has been fixed for centuries. So, why is it currently being called something new? An invention for someone to justify their wages or try and look smarter than they are? Or complete ignorance of island nation history? Probably a mix.9 Elsewhere, the hybrid navy approach raises questions: if sea-time experience has plummeted? Why? Because wouldn’t someone point out that the ocean’s ruthlessness on equipment knows no bounds and requires sailors, let alone to maintain it, or do we face a navy where no sailors want to go sea or even the ability to do so? If so, ‘game over’. If anything, “hybrid” may be merely political cover—a way of avoiding confrontation about the uncomfortable truth: Britain’s warship numbers are at historical lows, critical equipment programs remain unfunded, and to be a seapower you need hulls, aka presence.

Britain should lead global intellectual thought on naval and maritime matters, irrelevant of the Royal Navy’s size or power. We maybe at a turning point: those who deliberately apply historical wisdom to future planning—what I’ll call “inheritance thinkers”—seem increasingly likely to emerge from nations like the United States, Australia, and Japan rather than Britain. For those who resist historical study, the maxim “everything old is new again” takes on urgent relevance. The British Army insists on framing continental commitment as permanent purpose,10 rather than acknowledging its historically limited role for an island force that should operate primarily as an expeditionary service. The army unwillingness to accept its role has caused issues for defence and the navy for centuries but ultimately has undermined the armies own ability to manage its equipment and force structure: blaming government for the army, although partially true isn’t the whole picture and goes to the heart of the destruction of national strategy. Meanwhile, the RAF has effectively grounded its identity in nostalgia — the only narrative it can construct. Any serious thinker understands that this cognitive stagnation may be terminal, and that is without throwing into the mix the future of defence organisation, budgets, and the ever-changing technological landscape which is shifting at rapid pace––from seabed to space. The historical omission is not accidental; it’s strategic blindness.

As I argued in my PhD research: when an organisational culture is existing opposite to the truth, deliberately emphasises land minded centricity, a falseness, how can we expect meaningful change? Official positions—civilian or military—and governments seeking education remain closed to historical wisdom precisely because the system was designed to resist realignment. The irony is this: Britain has long claimed expertise in strategy through to Cabinet level, yet its defence institutions are fundamentally structured to prevent the integrated maritime approach that was proven to have worked for centuries.

The harsh message is clear: since the late 1980s, by every metric: every tactic attempted to address declining understanding of the Royal Navy and maritime strategy have failed—exposing the hollow promises of “solution” frameworks and false prophets in British naval thinking that treated a deep structural problem as if it were solvable through programmatic fixes. Navalism and calls for things like a ‘Navy League’11 demonstrate a fundamental ignorance of history and national strategy—and more importantly, of how seablindness has historically been addressed. The result? Nothing substantive has shifted. This remains the status quo and from that, don’t expect the future––or fate––of British seapower and Royal Navy to change.

Again, we can turn to the wisdom of the past, as Admiral of the Fleet John Rushworth Jellicoe (1859-1935) told an American audience: 12

The worst possible people to talk about and promote the Royal Navy, are Royal Navy Officers.

Conclusion?

These few points, if thrown into a mixing pot, represent a perilous situation. As ever, organisational failure is a series of smaller mistakes that amount to a bigger one. The last great Admiralty Secretary warned, as he did to the US Navy, that constant change is tantamount to chaos and here we are.

In short, this article was for me to go back and test ‘Seablindness and Royal Navy’,13 to see if anything had changed. It has not, in fact it’s got worse. The Royal Navy may need Parliament or Cabinet to treat it differently—perhaps as a failing department or local council under special status. This would require a civilian leader with authority surpassing the First Sea Lord. “First Lord of the Admiralty” or “Admiralty Secretary” seems no less appropriate, though ironically, the previous holders had warned that current trends would inevitably play out this way. The land-centric MoD was successful in suppressing their warnings, it never intended to let official acknowledgment occur of what they said.

Fortunately, this will appear in my forthcoming book based on my PhD.

In the January 2026 edition of Warships International Fleet Review, (on sale in e-version and print in the UK & abroad after 19 Dec 2025), I point out restoring Britain to its proven national strategy, alongside fundamental defence organisational change is the key to defending Britain and it’s interests while addressing a litany of issues plaguing British defence. Island nations should not be warmongering, but thinking more intelligently about their approach to contemporary defence threats.

The full article is available in print and e-print. The publishers website is:

https://warshipsifr.com/

Please support publishing where and when you can.

Publications

• Book (2021) | The British Way of War: Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy | Andrew Lambert

  • Book Launch, 8 November 2021, King’s College London, hosted by James WE Smith

• Journal Vol CX (2022), Issue 3 | The [UK] Naval Review Corbett 100 Edition | UKNR

  • Thinking about Seapower | Andrew Lambert

  • Some Principles of Maritime Strategy Making in the Royal Navy Today | Kevin Rowlands

  • War in Ukraine: Strategically What Would Have Corbett Said? | Geoffrey Till

  • Corbett 100: A Long Hard Look in the Mirror | James WE Smith

Papers

• Paper [2022] | Re-learning from Corbett: Applied History to the rescue of Strategic Thought | James WE Smith

• Paper [2019] | Corbett offers more on Space than Mitchell. | James WE Smith

• Paper C100 Primer [2018] | “Corbett’s Relevance to the Modern Strategic Thinker.” | James WE Smith

Seminars including Podcast and Video

• International Seminar [2025] Hosted by the Ecole Navale, Brest. Corbett in the 21^st Century.

• Online Seminar [2023] | Corbett and the Imperial Japanese Navy | Hiraku Yabuki

• Online Seminar [2022] | Sir Julian Corbett as a Historian, Educator, and Strategic Thinker | Defence Studies Department / JSC Shrivenham

• Online Seminar [2021] | The British Influence Upon American Visions of ‘Sea Power’ and History | David Kohnen

• Podcast [2021] | Sir Julian Corbett, Jutland and the Concept of ‘Decisive’ Battle, and the educational value of experience.| Andrew Lambert

Other

• David Kohnen, “Then & Now: Establishing the Principles of Maritime Strategy”, In Touch Magazine, Autumn/Winter 2019, King’s College London

• Mark Bailey, “Sea Supply versus Maritime Trade: Australian Vulnerabilities in the 21st Century. “ Australian Naval Review 2025 issue 2, pp.62-83.

CORBETT 100 CONFERENCE

LONDON, MAY 25-26, 2022

The Corbett 100 Conference at King’s College London brings together international scholars, serving and retired military personnel and policy makers to mark the centenary of the death of Sir Julian Corbett.

The conference explores the life of Sir Julian and his scholarship on maritime strategy and naval history. The conference will discuss his enduring relevance to contemporary strategy, strategic studies and defence policy and why he remains one of the ‘great’ strategic theorists amongst contemporaries such as Carl Von Clausewitz.

The conference is central to the Corbett 100 project and starts a series of events.

Programme

Day 1

0930 – Arrival Refreshments

1000 – Welcome to King’s College London, the Corbett 100 Project.

• Dr James W E Smith | Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

Sir Julian Corbett at Kings: setting an agenda?’

• Professor Andrew Lambert | Laughton Chair for Naval History

Theme: Sir Julian Corbett, his Scholarship, and Perspectives

Panel 1. Corbett and the Evolution of Naval history

Chair and Presenter: Rachel Blackman-Rogers | PhD Candidate, King’s College London

-Dr Alan James | King’s College London ‘Making Sense of Tudor Naval Power’.

-Professor Richard Harding | University of Westminster ‘Corbett’s Seven Years War’.

12.00-13.00 Lunch – Council Room & Old Committee Room

13.00- 15.00 Panel 2. ‘The British Way of War’.

Chair and Presenter: Dr Hilary Briffa| Department of War Studies, King’s College London

-Dr Dan Whittingham | University of Birmingham ‘The British Way of War’.

-Dr Rob Johnson | Director of the Oxford Changing Character of War Centre.

‘Soldiers and Maritime Strategy’

-Dr Louis Halewood | University of Plymouth ‘The International Navy of the World’? Britain, the United States, and the Naval Balance of Power, 1919-1922’

15.00-15.30 Break - Council Room & Old Committee Room

15.30- 17.00 Panel 3. The Legal Dimension and International impact.

Chair and Presenter: Dr Gabriela A Frei | Jesus College, University of Oxford

-Dr Alan M Anderson ‘Corbett and International Law: The Immunity of Private Property at Sea.’

-Dr Jake J Widen ‘Impact and Influence: Corbett in Sweden’.

1700-1900 Reception – Council Room & Old Committee Room

Day 2.

0930 – Arrival Refreshments

Theme: Sir Julian’s Influence Beyond Britain

10.00 Welcome - Professor Andrew Lambert

10.10 – 12.00 Panel 4. The Sea Commonwealth & AUKUS Anticipated: Corbett in the Anglosphere.

1010: Chair: Dr James W E Smith | Department of War Studies, King’s College London | Corbett 100 Committee

-Dr David Kohnen, CDR USN (Ret) | U.S. Naval War College

‘Crossing the Atlantic: Corbett and the Development of American Maritime Strategy.’

-Lt Cmdr Mark Bailey PhD RAN | Australian Naval Institute.

‘Corbett, Empire and Commonwealth.’

12.00-13.00 Lunch – Council Room & Old Committee Room

Theme: British Maritime Strategy and The Royal Navy after 1945

13.00-15.00 Panel 5. Corbett’s Legacy and Maritime Strategy: Decline and Revival?

Chair: Lt Cmdr Mark Bailey PhD, RAN | Australian Naval Institute | Corbett 100 Committee

-Dr James W E Smith ‘The Abolition of Admiralty and the Continental Commitment.’

15.00-15.30 Break - Council Room & Old Committee Room

15.30- 17.00 Panel 6. Corbett and the Contemporary Royal Navy?

Chair: Dr David Kohnen, CDR USN (Ret) | U.S. Naval War College| Corbett 100 Committee

-Commander Andrew Livsey RN | Hudson Fellow, St Antony’s College, Oxford

‘The Royal Navy and Corbett 1990-2020.’

-Captain Kevin Rowlands RN | Head Royal Navy Strategic Studies

‘Some Principles of Maritime Strategy Making in the Royal Navy Today.’

1700: Closing Remarks and Keynote: Professor Andrew Lambert

17.30: End of Conference

2022 Goldrick Conference – A ‘Corbett 100’ Event

Australia, 21 September 2022

Adams Auditorium Australian Defence Force Academy

The 2022 Goldrick Conference on Indo-Pacific Maritime Strategy in the 21^st Century brought together an outstanding array of 20 international and Australian speakers to discuss the future of maritime operations in our region.

In addition to a presentation by the Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Mark Hammond, the conference speakers included some of today’s most eminent naval and defence thinkers, providing an outstanding opportunity for anyone interested in Australia’s and the region’s security to gain insights from these leading experts in their fields.

The 2022 Goldrick Conference was held in partnership with the Australian Defence Force Academy, the University of New South Wales (Canberra), the Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources & Security and the Sea Power Centre Australia. The industry partners were Thales Australia, ADROITA and the Australian Missile Corporation.

Presentation Speakers

Session 1

Setting the Scene Session Chair: Dr Liz Buchanan

0745-0825 Registration & Coffee/Tea

0825-0830 Introduction & Administrative Remarks Vice Admiral Peter Jones AO DSC RAN (Retired)

ANI President

0830-0835 Welcome

Professor Douglas Guilfoyle

Professor of International Law and Security

University of New South Wales (Canberra)

0835-0840 Sponsors’ Welcome Mr Chris Jenkins Thales Australia

0840-0845 A Message from Chief of Navy Australia Vice Admiral Mark Hammond AM RAN , Chief of Navy

0845-0910 Sir Julian Corbett – His Place among Maritime Strategists Dr John Reeve

University of NSW (Canberra)

0910-1010

Sir Julian Corbett & Indo-Pacific Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century

Professor Andrew Lambert FKC, Laughton Professor of Naval History at King’s College

London.

1010-1040 Morning Tea

1040-1110 Corbett & the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought

Professor Kevin D. McCranie

The Philip A. Crowl Professor of Comparative Strategy

US Naval War College

1110-1125 Facilitated Discussion Dr Liz Buchanan

Session 2

Australian Perspectives on Maritime Strategy Session Chair: Ms Sarah Pavillard

1125-1200 An Australian Perspective on Corbett Going Forward Associate Professor Bec Strating

Executive Director of La Trobe Asia

1200-1240 Lunch

1240-1305 A RAN Perspective on Maritime Strategy Rear Admiral Chris Smith CSM RAN, Deputy Chief of Navy

1305-1335 AUKUS, Defence Industry and an Emerging Strategy Rear Admiral Lee Goddard CSC RAN (Retired)

1335-1350 Facilitated Discussion Ms Sarah Pavillard

Session 3

International Perspectives on Maritime Strategy Session Chair: Associate Professor David Kohnen

1355-1420 A US Perspective on Contemporary Maritime Strategy, Rear Admiral Jeff Harley USN (Retired) Senior Fellow, Center for Maritime Strategy Navy League of the United States

1420-1445 A Canadian Perspective on Contemporary Maritime Strategy, Professor Paul Mitchell, Professor of Defence Studies, Canadian Defence College

1445-1510 An Indian Perspective on Contemporary Maritime Strategy Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande AVSM IN (Retired)

1510-1535 Facilitated Discussion Associate Professor David Kohnen

1535-1550 Afternoon Tea

Session 4

Different voices on Contemporary Maritime Strategy

1550-1640 Panel 1 Evolving Indo-Pacific Maritime Strategies in the era of AUKUS Facilitated by Commodore Allison Norris

Mr Dongkeun Lee (ANU).

Associate Professor Ryan Wadle (USNWC)Dr Richard Dunley (UNSW)

Mr Justin Burke (Macquarie Uni)

1640-1725 Panel 2 Making Maritime Strategies to Government, the Military and the Public relevant Facilitated by Ms Miesje de Vogel

Associate Professor David Kohnen (USNWC)

Captain Alastair Cooper (SPC-A)

Dr John Nash (AWM)

Lieutenant Sarah Lucinsky (HMAS Creswell)

1725-1730 Concluding Remarks Dr Mark Bailey Corbett 100 Organising Committee

1900-2200 Speakers’ Dinner with ADFA Students ADFA Cadets Mess

Guest Speaker: The Hon. Dr Brendan Nelson AO.

“The League of Peace and a Free Sea”

Sir Julian Corbett and the Application of History in the Twenty-First

United States of America: 9-13 MAY 2023

0815 Welcome Remarks

Rear Admiral Shoshana S. Chatfield, U.S. Navy, President, U.S. Naval War College

0830 Keynote Address

Professor Andrew Lambert, Kings College London, ‘The Spectre of Navalism’ in the 21st Century

0900 Panel 1 – On Strategy from Clausewitz to Corbett

· Chair, Professor Geoffrey Till, U.S. Naval War College

· Professor Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, U.S. Naval War College, How to Plan a War with Limited Objectives:

Clausewitz’s War Plans from 1830-1831 and Corbett’s Evaluation of Them

· Professor Evan Wilson, U.S. Naval War College, Revisiting Corbett’s Campaign of Trafalgar

· Professor Kevin McCranie, U.S. Naval War College, Corbett as Strategic Thinker

1030 Break

1045 Panel 2 – “The League of Peace and A Free Sea”

· Chair, Dr. Ryan Wadle, U.S. Naval War College

· Dr. Jayne Friend, The University of Portsmouth,

Anglo-American Naval Relations and the Representation and Adoption of the Town-Class Destroyers

· Dr. Louis Halewood, University of Plymouth

Leading the ‘League of Peace:’ British Perspectives on Maritime Co-operation, 1899-1919

· Professor Jesse Tumblin, U.S. Naval War College, The ‘League of Peace’ and the ‘Storm Center:’ The British

Dominions in the Anglo-American Naval Relationship

1215 Lunch – Naval Staff College Wardroom

1330 Panel 3 – Cheer Up, There is No Naval War College

· Chair, Dr. David Kohnen, U.S. Naval War College

· Mr. Blackley, Independent Scholar, Laying the Groundwork for Sims: Albert P. Niblack as the First Inspector

of Target Practice and the Gunnery Revolution in the U.S. Navy

· Dr. Branden Little, Weber State University

‘The Unvarnished Truth:’ William S. Sims, Tracy B. Kittredge, and Naval History in Two World Wars

· Dr. John Kuehn, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth Kansas,

Corbett in History and the Future of American Maritime Strategy

1500 Break

1515 Keynote Address

Dr. John Maurer, U.S. Naval War College, The Washington Naval Conference – A Century On

1545 Panel 4 – The Conduct of An Oversea Naval Campaign

· Chair, Mr. Richard Frank, Pacific War History, Inc.

· Professor Mark Fiorey, U.S. Naval War College, Organized Confusion, The Building of Advance Base Lion-6

· Mr. Wil Painter, Retired

The Adventures of Wild Bill, The Covert Reconnaissance of CAPT Wilfred L. Painter, CEC, USNR

· Mr. D.M. Giangreco, Remarks on Second World War Research in the 21st Century

1715 Day 1 Summary Remarks

Dr. David Kohnen, U.S. Naval War College

Looking Outward to the Stars while Checking the Phosphorescent Wake – Corbett 100 and Beyond

1730 Conference Reception – Naval War College Museum

Thursday, May 11

0830 Keynote Address

Dr. Christopher Bell, Dalhousie University

British Grand Strategy in the First World War: Winston Churchill vs. Sir Julian Corbett

0900 Panel 5 – Corbett, MacKinder, and Contemporary American Strategy

· Chair, Dr. Nick Gvosdev, U.S. Naval War College

· Professor Geoff Sloan, University of Reading, Geopolitics as an Aid to Statecraft

· Dr. Len Hochberg, MacKinder Forum—U.S., Money-Power, Technology-Power, and Manpower: The

Contemporary Relevance of Halford Mackinder’s Grand Strategy

1030 Break

1045 1215 1315 Panel 6 – Corbett and Professional Education into the Twenty-First Century

· Chair, Dr. Jon Scott Logel, U.S. Naval War College

· Dr. Charlotte Hulme, United States Military Academy

Corbett, ‘Major Strategy,’ and the Issue of ‘Grand Strategy’ at West Point

· Mr. Thomas Duffy, U.S. National War College, Corbett and the National War College

· Professor Chuck Steele, U.S. Air Force Academy, Corbett Looming Over the U.S. Air Force Academy

Lunch – Naval Staff College Wardroom

Panel 7 – Corbett and International Law

· Chair, Professor Andrew Lambert, Kings College London

· Dr. Alan Anderson, Alan Anderson Law Firm LLC

Sir Julian Corbett and International Law: Does it Matter Anymore?

· Dr. Gabriela Frei, University of Oxford, Corbett and the Immunity of Private Property at Sea

· Professor James Kraska, U.S. Naval War College, Freedom of the Seas in Mahan and Corbett

Lunch – Naval Staff College Wardroom

Panel 7 – Corbett and International Law

· Chair, Professor Andrew Lambert, Kings College London

· Dr. Alan Anderson, Alan Anderson Law Firm LLC

Sir Julian Corbett and International Law: Does it Matter Anymore?

· Dr. Gabriela Frei, University of Oxford, Corbett and the Immunity of Private Property at Sea

· Professor James Kraska, U.S. Naval War College, Freedom of the Seas in Mahan and Corbett

Panel 8 – Global Perspectives on Corbett

· Chair, Captain Bryan Leese, U.S. Navy (Retired), U.S. Naval War College

· Rear Admiral Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande, Indian Navy (Retired)

Corbett and Conundrums of India’s Continentality and Maritimeness; and the Role of the Quad

· Rear Admiral Katsuya Yamamoto, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (Retired), Sasakawa Peace

Foundation, Corbett and the Indo-Pacific in the 21st Century

· Vice Admiral Peter Jones, Royal Australian Navy (Retired), Australian Naval Institute

Corbett and ‘Some Principles’ for the 21st Century

1630 Day 2 Summary Remarks

Professor Geoff Sloan, University of Reading, Corbett, MacKinder, and the 21st Century

Friday, May 12

0830 Keynote Address

Vice Admiral Peter Jones, Royal Australian Navy(Retired), Australian Naval Institute

Some Principles About Corbett and the Late Rear Admiral James Goldrick, Royal Australian Navy – Thirty Years

After ‘Mahan is Not Enough’

0900 Panel 9 – Americans ‘Looking Outward’ to Corbett and Beyond the Stars

· Chair, Commander Ryan Vest, U.S. Navy, U.S. Naval War College

· Mr. Trent Hone, ICF International

‘Crushing Blows:’ Sir Julian Corbett’s Influence on U.S. World War II Pacific Strategy

· Dr. Peter Luebke, Naval History and Heritage Command, Corbett and the Practice of History

· Professor David Winkler, U.S. Naval War College

Warnings from the Past in Contemporary American Maritime Affairs

1030 Panel 10 – Orbiting Corbett

· Chair, Professor Sam Tangredi, U.S. Naval War College

· Dr. John J. Klein, George Washington University, Corbett in Orbit: A Maritime Inspired Space Strategy

· Dr. James W.E. Smith, Kings College London

Corbett for the Next Generation of Strategists: From ‘Land-Think’ to ‘Seabed to Space’?

1200 Closing Remarks

Professor Andrew Lambert, Kings College London, ‘The League of Peace and a Free Sea’ in the 21st Century

Corbett 100: Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: From Seabed to Space

France, 2 and 3 Dec 2025.

This conference was held in France, by invite of the French Navy.

The Corbett 100 Project team present our fourth conference: “Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: from Seabed to Space”.

This naval strategy seminar sees scholars from the UK, US, France, Australia, Japan and the Netherlands look to the future of Naval Strategy.

A invitation only conference, open to online attendance on application.

2 December – Seminar Day 1

All times indicated are in Paris time (GMT+1)

Morning session

09:00 AM: Welcome Address & École Navale’s Tour

• 9:30 AM: Andrew Lambert, King’s College London : “The Corbett 100 initiative”

• 10:00 AM: Panel I: Naval Strategy: Methodological and Historiographical Perspectives

• Olivier Chaline, Sorbonne Université, Corbett from an 18th-century specialist

• Martin Motte, École Pratique des Hautes Études, The Navy of the Bourbon Restoration (1814 - 1830) : a reappraisal

• Henk Warnar, Netherlands Defence Academy, The role of Corbett’s limited war theory in Dutch naval thought

Afternoon session

1:30 PM: Panel II: Corbett today and tomorrow: Operational Challenges.

Keynote Lectures for the cadets and staff of the École Navale.

• Captain Keïto Ushirogata (online), Strategic Studies Department, JMSDF

• Command and Staff College

• Mark Bailey, Australian Defence Forces Academy

• Andrew Lambert, King’s College London

4:00 PM: Ecole Navale’s Research Institute Tour

4:45 PM: Corbett today and tomorrow: Strategic Foresight

• Roy de Ruiter, Netherlands Defence Academy, Strategic Foresight in the Dutch Navy

• Andrew Young, Royal Navy Strategic Studies Center, RN Strategic Foresight and the challenge of amphibious operations.

• Jean-Marie Kowalski, École navale, History of French Strategic Foresight since 1958

3 December – Seminar Day 2

All times indicated are in Paris time (GMT+1)

Morning session

09:00 AM: Panel III: Corbett today and tomorrow: Seabed warfare and SLOCs

• Magali Michiels, Vrije Universiteit, Brussels, Protection of critical infrastructure in the North Sea

• Lyna Maaziz, École navale, Law and politics in the undersea domain

• Guillaume de Rougé, École navale, UxVs implications for tactics, operational concepts, and strategy

‘Endgame for Seablindness: defence organisation and the future of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy.’

I argue, the future of navies, let alone strategy, and warfare may very well depend on the future steps taken with the next iteration of defence organisation––for one is now long overdue––whatever form that needs to be, it must be of one united from seabed to space.

Opening Paragraph:

It is an overlooked fundamental fact that the analysis of history proves, since the founding of a professional navies, which started with the Royal Navy in 1546, that if you cannot communicate what this military power is for, or what both ‘maritime’ and ‘sea’ mean to a nation, then nothing else matters. Most issues, debates, discord, discussions, and disagreements flow from the failure to consider this the number one priority. This uncomfortable fact has been forgotten, because too often naval minds are tourists in nostalgia––something antithetical to the fact that the very best maritime thinkers and naval personnel were rebellious to status quos, and adverse to the comfort of armchairs of the wardroom––and yet this is understandable to some degree. This is because few have accepted that the centrality of American naval power and British seapower to their respective nations ended after 1945. Although there are many factors at play, critically, the organisational setup of unified defence broke down the systems for communicating about the navy and seas influence on nation. Past systems to communicate were taken for granted, today misunderstood, let alone never rejuvenated. This is partially the root of why many in leadership roles have struggled to communicate about the navy in an effort to encourage those with the authority to take that message and act upon it, particularly after the 1980s defence reforms and the end of the first Cold War.

Preview of content:

But seablindness is not a mere matter of ‘literacy’; behind seablindness is something more important: our understanding of our world and the space around it, and ultimately how our civilization works. The majority of humans do not think in these terms and are far less sensitive to the fragility of the nation, life, and dependency on logistics on Planet Ocean [Earth] than previous generations. This reminds us that rampant navalism won’t singularly solve the issue, as the public’s views on what the navy is and what it is for vary more widely than those of any other military service. Arguably, you can’t ever beat the scale of the seablindness problem, just contain it the best you can. A helpful analogy is that astronauts will never be able to truly explain their experience in space because the majority of the human populace has no way of connecting with what they are talking about.

To reverse course from seablindness completing its journey, a journey complete when enough factors have aligned as they now appear to be, will rest on two future actions…

UK Naval Review Link.

US Naval Institute Link.

If Lord Nelson were here today he would be much encouraged by the inquisitive and educated minds of the modern military. Equally, for matters concerning seapower and the Royal Navy, he would have some concerns. Nelson would have encouraged others to think and question, for he too questioned values of the past and subsequently made up his own mind. His victory at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, saw him abandon proven battle tactics, breaking with tradition to do something evolutionary and new, yet guided by experience. He believed there was always ways for the military to improve, that although questioning accepted values, he sought better and fairer solutions, particularly for his sailors and marines. In short, people matter, and so that if any man––or women–– wants to ‘stand tall on the quarter deck’ in pursuit of the same cause, then he would see them looked after, and equally protected from whims of the public and the variances of the political body. All of his life, he sought to improve his men and their conditions.

But Nelson was no fool, he was able to distinguish between the good and bad, right and wrong, justice and injustice. While he clung to some traditions like honour, patriotism, courage, and duty, he did so by instilling the same into his men so that when they went to battle they did so with pride and reserved stoic confidence, not arrogance. He taught his men, his friends, his colleagues that one could defend their country, but not surrender their ideals. That one can add to a vision of peace and have no better satisfaction in doing something about it, with honour, through the profession of arms. It was Nelson’s character, evidenced and proven over time, that resulted in those around him holding him in the highest esteem.

Today, yes, much has changed and also some other things have not. The lifeblood of civilization flows still along the sealanes and trade sets the commons for wider interactions between peoples. As Nelson reminds, and something that sets navies aside from the other services, the enemy is the asset-–the ship, submarine, aircraft etc––and the sea: once victory objectives are achieved, the humanity of sailors and marines to help save souls from the seas becomes paramount, rather then pursuing things in a bloodthirsty, pure ‘war fighting’ manner. Nelson gave his life, so that his country might be safe and the seas remain free because he believed there can be no higher service or calling than to watch over those who go about their business in peace and even more so on the great waters that make planet ocean.

There was lesson in this, it offered insight to militaries far beyond Britain, including some civilian leadership and politicians who chose to learn more about Nelson and what happens on the oceans. For in most nations, it is a choice to go to the sea and learn about it for geography remains central to the shape of politics, culture and relationships between nations One such individual was America’s First Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, who had a long standing affection for Nelson. As a former US Secretary of the Navy during the final years of World War Two, his task postwar was to enable unity of effort between the military services, hashing out questions like roles, functions, missions and how they can work better together. This was a task that no politician, no leader had faced in the United States. In the end, it claimed Forrestal’s life. But Forrestal took inspiration from the best great British and American naval individuals. he did so because he understood that the role of Defense Secretary was to throw away previous biases and instead to be an arbiter, a decision maker and the guardian of the forum to enable the advancement of the military and protect those who are engaged in the profession of arms. In his personal, now declassified correspondence, he pointed out, and in not so many words to the US Congress and the US President, that a Defense Secretary must never become involved in the minutia of the military, they respect them to pursue their daily business and ultimately never over centralize power. The temptation, a word of warning to future defence leaders from Forrestal, was that a Defense Secretary or Defence Minister must never become a tyrannical leader, brutish in method, ‘gung ho’ or a ‘King maker’. If this happened, then the ability to maintain a workable military in a democracy or republic was quickly placed in jeopardy, for the culture of organization can be the dividing line between victory and defeat. Forrestal took from the fact that Lord Nelson respected their Lordship’s in the Admiralty, whose primary task was to educate and advise the government to national strategy and the role of seapower, while letting naval personnel get on with their jobs at sea. Forrestal’s view was Defense Secretaries have other tasks to be getting on with than backseat driving professional personnel of arms, whether they be sailor, marine, solider or other wise. But Forrestal was a generation who knew the suffering of total war, while faced with new weapons of mass destruction they sought to maintain the peace best they could, navigating defence policy and strategy through choppy waters the best they could.

Today, there is a lot of talk of soldiering and ‘warfighers’ [not a word in the Oxford dictionary], while military history is often twisted, as its always been, to suit the individual who is spinning a tale. But today’s language is all ‘land talk’, reflective of a world that sees the military purely through the eyes of platoons, regiments and land battles. We know this is not the case today, from seabed to space, to cyber, warfare has changed, as it has always been doing so. An ‘this way or the high way’ or arrogance of ‘shut up and get out we know better today’ approach is misguided when history offers us insight from all domains. This should not be so easily discarded just to suit matters of the moment. Nelson would have relished this defence environment today for provided more choice, more ability, more capability to think about how to defeat his enemy because ultimately defence is about thinking wisely and acting boldly. Equally, although I will not explore here, in the final frontier, to hostile environments like the seabed, there is something to take from Nelson and the age of sail, for the ideal of thinking more wisely about strategy, tactics and the warfare echo into our contemporary debates.

Some claim true or total war is dead, others claim war is inevitable, let us hope the former is still what many aspire for in an era where the pain of the generation fighting in Nelson’s time or over the 20th century has become disconnected from the mindset of today’s leaders and young people. To use an analogy, we must be all mindful of the those who think they are going to get into fight, so walk into the bar, and start that fight: a self-fulfilling prophecy. But if we can take anything from Nelson’s navy, it is to push back against warmongering. Instead approach it from the ethos that the task of our navies today is to keep war dead. They must do so from a position of strategic strength and advantage but only if necessary, ready and able defend their nation and global lifelines against aggression, for that is human nature in all generations.

It is generally accepted that the founding of England’s Royal Navy marked the starting point of military power at sea. Although England had a form of naval or maritime power and forces prior to King Henry VIII creating the ‘Council of Marine’ in 1546, which is commonly referred to later as the Admiralty, what is essential is that it made the future pathway for establishing standards and professionalism. In short, we combine professionalism with organisation as the founding principle of a military service.

Following this accepted fact that has been in place for centuries, the US Department of the Navy, established on April 30, 1798, would continue to function in the same role in the story of American naval power, marking 227 years of service of the US Navy that we understand in its base form today. Although there is some wiggle room in this, as the US Navy was established on March 27, 1794, it is older; yet, the Department of Navy was not created by Congress until a few years later. Historians would counter that there is little difference between the revolutionary naval forces and the Continental Navy, and the US Navy of today. The fact that America did not sustain its naval force (1775-1785), and it had to be renewed in the period in which the creation of a Navy Department in the 1790s, instead makes the point that the US Navy of today and its forebear is no different from English maritime forces being distinct from the Royal Navy under King Henry VIII.

Either way, this nuance is important for many of today’s naval and sea powers, great and small, who have evolved with the times serving based on the geographical realities of which nation owns them. America is no different. For example, islands will always use seapower differently than that of great continental powers, even one like the US, which is flanked by two oceans; that mass of land can still undermine the best arguments of American naval power, rendering them subservient to concepts that erode the efficacy of sea power and maritime strategy.

American naval power, reaching its zenith during the Second World War, was a notable anomaly in reality, and demand forced America into action rather than an active choice. It stands distinctly alone compared to other periods in the history of the US Navy, a path that other navies––which are not islands––, such as European navies, have taken. By the end of 1945, America’s navy was viewed as coming of age. Its success in the Pacific theatre of World War Two was immortalised. In my 2021 PhD thesis and forthcoming title, I argued that this was ‘America’s Campaign of Trafalgar.’ It began with the Battle of Midway in 1942 and continued through to the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944. These victories, including that of the US Marine Corps, became central to the US Navy’s self-confidence and its place in the broader national identity as the navy looked to establish a prominent role in postwar national defence.

Nevertheless, it was short-lived, as debates over the US Navy and defense organization took place post-war. In Washington, D.C., the politics of defence, with deep roots, made it appear that by 1946, the US Navy had done very little in wartime. In reality, the aspiration of many Americans and US naval personnel to surpass the Royal Navy had ended in disaster as they turned their backs on what they should never have lost sight of, which was the vulnerability of a naval power answering to a continental country where the minds of land-thinkers dominate. This struggle has not changed since, and in 2025 only deepened.

Either way, at 250 years of America’s military power at sea, it is a choice to go to sea, something that many Americans and those who support US naval power often forget. A choice can also turn into a choice not to. That should be the message at this juncture.

How defence is organised is fundamental in enabling or hindering national policy and strategy in peace and wartime. Equally, the organisation of defence impacts command and control of military forces, the effectiveness of civil-military relations, and more. With a political rebrand of the US ‘Department of Defense’ to ‘Department of War’ taking place, Dr James WE Smith explores some points on defence organisation by reflecting on his PhD completed at King’s in 2021.

Today, monolithic-sized defence departments are accepted without question as part of the bureaucratic machinery of government. Scholars have researched defence policy, civil-military relations, and a range of other high-level topics related to national defence and security, such as strategy and doctrine. In the background has been the overarching organisation of defence for centuries. Our understanding of the history of defence organisation has lacked serious study, often limited to short official histories, and resultingly misunderstood. In recent decades, defence reorganisation has haphazardly reappeared on the agendas of governments, often as a subsect of broader ‘defence reform’. This is a marked changed from the decades after the Second World War as it was one of the leading matters in defence debate in Britain and the United States.

Defence organisation in the UK and US today operates in a form of ‘unified defence’. This system emerged during the 1940s to 1960s, replacing standalone executive government departments that represented the affairs of their respective military services, such as the Admiralty for the Royal Navy in Britain or the War Department for the US Army in America. Reorganisation was far from a simple process in either country, as defence organisation is all-encompassing. Official accounts of the main period of unification itself, 1941-1960, and subsequent changes, as well as other political, military, budgetary, and legal debates over the 20th century, have often obscured truth and historical facts. Many of the promises that unified defence would solve issues have fallen short, created new problems while addressing others. Critically, both nations failed to transfer useful institutional knowledge and practical corporate memory into the contemporary defence setup. The fact that defence organisational reform continues to this day, only completing plans from decades ago, long overdue scrutiny and assessment of relevance, or making endless modifications, proves the point that constant turmoil is tantamount to chaos. Ultimately, there are significant flaws in our understanding and approach to what defence organisation is and what it is for.

For some, defence organisation is a struggle between military service agendas and budgets. In contrast, others are concerned with the decentralisation and centralisation of power, command, and control. These chop and change with the times they serve, as they should. However, a myth persists at the heart of political and military minds when it comes to defence: the notion that a perfect defence organisation exists. The reality is that the concept of an organisational utopia is a dangerous one but not a new on; political minds and military service ideologues have been vying for centuries, battling and arguing over what may and may not work in nations that can pick and choose their national strategy, such as America. A helpful analogy could be that some believe in a ‘holy grail’ for defence organisations when none existed, while others sought the dominance of one military service over another. These debates vary depending on the geography of the land a nation calls its home, for continental countries like the United States can choose their strategies, modify their policies, and adapt doctrines. By comparison, island nations such as Britain have no choice in their national strategic doctrine, which is why their defence organisation has remained consistent for centuries, as it serves a singular purpose: the national strategy right for an island. Subsequently with the creation of the UK Ministry of Defence, British defence strategy betrayed centuries of national strategic experience––with maritime at its core––as defence organisation was fundamentally changed. Geography, culture, and ways of Government matter because they shape how the higher organisation of defence has developed, including the scope of how command and control interfaces with political power and civilian oversight over decades, if not centuries. Either way, the long history of defence organisation spans further back than the age of America itself, demonstrating perils and pitfalls, with dangerous tightrope lines that impact victory and defeat nationally or operationally. For all the criticism defence organisation receives, it also gets a lot right. Nevertheless, many ignore the fact that defence organisation is not static question or answer type situation with a defined endpoint. Instead, it is a living evolving process, requiring careful consideration and routine revaluation not just to improve on what has gone before but avoid undermining military operations and confidence in civilian and military leadership.

It must neither be forgotten or ignored that defence organisations answer to political and financial authority. Broadly, defence has always been vulnerable to whims, political cycles, and short-termism, among other factors. These factors and influences combined can lead to a perilous situation fraught with rabbit holes and traps, which can undermine the very best strategies and militaries, with plenty of examples to pick from the days of classical Rome and Greece, the execution of the First World War, to the struggles in conflicts after the Second World War like America’s ‘Vietnam War’. The reality is that scars from past defence organisational debates and reforms have left a bitter taste in the minds of politicians and militaries on both sides of the Atlantic. The result is that debate on defence organisation has become less robust, for fear of stoking political fires and inflaming military rivalries, fostering misplaced concepts, and enabling false accusations, all of which have undermined the opportunity to reflect deeply on defence organisation and its many parts. Stagnation has set in. The concept of an organisational utopia is a dangerous one, nor a new one, for it is more often than the case been that it has been used as a scapegoat to cover up questions that few want to answer such as operational failure and higher loss of life than expected. Fewer are equipped to address and even less that have a plan to answer probing questions, or may want to avoid scrutiny of failure, incompetency and inadequacies in leadership, planning, capabilities, policy and more try to blame organisation. This may have been a factor that led to the US Presidential Executive Order on 5 Sept 2025, ‘Restoring the United States Department of War’

The debate about this Executive Order has exposed many of the points mentioned above. Claims of restoring ‘military heritage’ overlook that, in America, the Department of War and the Department of the Navy were established as equals in 1789, as defined by the US Constitution, with the primacy of civilian control over the military. The Department of War was never dominant and the greatest champion of what would become the US Army, General George Washington (1732-1799), recognised along with the emerging nation the importance of sea power and military success was impossible without it, ultimately leading to the twin Department’s of War and Navy for no land force can [act] decisively unless it is accompanied by maritime superiority. In short, a series of legislative processes following the Second World War, driven by debates over unification and advocacy for an independent air force, ultimately led to the establishment of the Department of Defense by 1949. These plans were forged by a generation of men and women wanting to defend America’s interests, haunted by the experience of total war. Notably, a driving factor in creating the Department of Defense was the paranoia of pro-land force civilians and army officers who sought to conceal their relatively poor performance compared to the US Navy prior to 1941 and wanted to use organisation as a scapegoat for various issues. The assertion by some political figures that the notion of a singular Department of War for all defence is a historical fact, when it is not, raises an urgent question for the US Congress to explore current developments in defence organisation. It should not shirk its Constitutional responsibility to do so nor avoid executing its authority over defence organisation and expenditure, no matter the political turmoil that ensues. If a misguided and misinformed agenda or policy overrides a common commitment to national defence, then accountability must follow swiftly. This is no different in the UK, where defence reformists are implementing a tired and haphazard plan, as envisioned by the late Lord Mountbatten (1900-1979) which has since been exposed as flawed. The British parliament would find it a useful exercise to probe defence reform and reorganisation to assess the evidence behind current MoD plans for reform.

The generation that built unified defence was about aiming for peace but being ready for war, something enabled by a department of equal services, pulling together as one. This is far beyond a simple, unnuanced ‘offence versus defensive’ take and out of step with the fact that defence departments have engaged in offensive operations untold times since 1947. A narrow view of ‘offence’ and ‘defence’ overlooks the very fabric of centuries of military experience. Today, this is not a chess game of Roman and Greek combatants, Prussian land warfare tactics, nor quaint American militia and regiments or a sports game of teams on ‘offence’ and ‘defence’. Instead defence and security today is a complex interweaving of seabed to space, spanning strategic, operational and tactical advantage at sea, air dominance, space control, intelligence, AI and cyber war at the speed of light. And underlying all this are technological terrors that with one false move, one poor investment of taxpayers money or falling behind on strength of training, education, innovation and more, can make the difference between peace and war, victory and defeat. While the West tinkers with defence organisational irrelevancies, just as it did at times during the early Cold War – sufficiently distracting it to benefit Soviet Union space and naval power – today, other nations who seek to assert influence and to control and expand their military power won’t be wasting time and money on rebrands and are instead laser focused on the tasks that matter.

Ultimately, we must all remember that the primary task of any national defence establishment or organisation is to implement policy and execute national defence strategy. This is achieved by the cohesion of all the parts, allowing them to be brought together to achieve aims, objectives and strategy, as well as the baseline defence of the nation and its interests. This can only be achieved by avoiding false narratives, as the analysis of experience is paramount; otherwise, strategy and policy-making are on questionable grounds. The past should not dictate the future. But it can provide insight and guidance to contribute to an ethos that embraces the evolution of learning to keep moving forward. Instead of rebrands, decision-makers should be thinking about the next iteration of defence organisation and not missing the opportunity. No question or law should be ‘off the table’ for revisiting, such as:

How many military services and departments? How can financial controls be improved? Does command and control work effectively? Are we adapting to the pace of technological change efficiently? Does recruitment and retention align with modern ways of living? Is training and education working as a constant feedback loop from experience back into the classroom?

And so on. Alternatively, if old names and titles of departments are to be used literally and that results in domain-centric thinking such as land ruling, in an era where the lines between the services’ capabilities, missions and roles blur to the grey, there may be an argument to merge naval and marine forces with air forces, space forces and more under a common service, uniform and command.

Defence organisational reform is akin to Pandora’s box; in it lie perils and pitfalls, often with deep historical roots and contemporary challenges. The recent American Executive Order, although driven by questionable attitudes and nebulous claims, raises the long-overdue question of defence reform, and in it lies a useful opportunity. Yet, careful thought and consideration must always be given to reform, as it should not distract or undermine operations, plans, and other aspects of current defence and security.

In conclusion, defence organisation is not a museum, nor must it be viewed as an opportunity to be tourists in nostalgia. Defence organisation must keep moving forward based on the best experiences of the past yet remain responsive to the times it serves.

With thanks to King’s College London, who wanted to highlight the work completed when I was a PhD student.

Original: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/the-future-of-defence-organisation-resurfaces , 6 Oct 2025.

Delighted a book on one of my mentors will be published shortly (October 2025, Pen and Sword Books UK). It was an honour to aid the author on this project and my remarks are contained within and on the jacket along with Professor Andrew Lambert’s within.

The contribution of Commodore Michael Clapp has been overlooked when compared with the other senior Falklands commanders and the time is ripe to redress the balance. Despite commanding the Amphibious Task Group and being responsible for Operation Sutton, the successful San Carlos landing, Clapp was overlooked for promotion and instead received several snubs including not being allowed a seat at the top tables of public events celebrating this stunning victory.

Sadly, his naval superiors showed no interest in learning the amphibious lessons, and others, of the war preferring to focus on supporting the British army in a potential conflict with the Soviet Union in Europe. Michael Clapp’s career has illustrated many of the corrosive effects of inter-service rivalry and the author asks if the military establishment has now lost interest in amphibious operations in their purest form.

This highly readable and controversial work covers Clapp’s distinguished wider career which included active service in Korea, the Cyprus Emergency and the Indonesia-Malayan confrontation where he gained a reputation for decisive action. He was an observer and squadron commander in the Fleet Air Arm; took command of several warships and served in staff posts, playing a crucial role in the introduction of the famous Sea Harrier V/STOL strike aircraft before his appointment as Commodore Amphibious Warfare.

I am grateful to Dr Cumming’s and Micheal for the use of my work in the description and context of Micheal’s career. Some examples are included below:

I spent fifteen years studying the relationship between organisation and the development, understanding and execution of strategy for national defence. It culminated in a PhD in ‘War and Strategic Studies’ from King’s College London, Department of War Studies. The PhD was titled: ‘Deconstructing the Seapower State: Britain, America and Defence Unification.’ That study included an entirely new analysis of the history of defence unification, the process by which the U.S. Department of Defense and U.K. Ministry of Defence were created. It was the first comprehensive narrative of defence unification, which went far beyond official accounts by utilising new, original documentary evidence, oral history, miles of declassified material, and more.

Having stated my credentials, this note reflects on the recent discussions in the United States regarding the renaming of the U.S. Department of Defense to the ‘Department of War’. I wish to point out, in brief, some salient points:

• A significant force in the creation of a ‘Department of Defense’ was driven by the U.S. Army, which, in partnership with vocal advocates for an independent air force, believed that a unified defence department would be more effective in addressing their needs.

• The U.S. Army, paranoid about its relatively poor performance and in particular civilian and military leadership in the Department of War—the bureaucratic control and command hub of the army––in the latter 19^th and early 20^th century, unlike the U.S. Navy, sought organisational reform as a way to explain away, rather than address fundamental issues it had.

• The United States Navy was not represented in the Department of War; it had its own command and control in the form of the Department of the Navy prior to unification.

• Unified defence was also partly driven by the experience of the Second World War and rapidly changing post-war circumstances. Crucially, lessons and insights from wartime, such as the collaboration between the services, were a key consideration in the creation of legal acts that culminated in the establishment of the new Department of Defense. The head of the U.S. Navy summarised to Congress: “unity of effort”, in short, matters like combined operations were vital to carry forward in a new organisational setup.

• The Pentagon was initially designed to house the Department of War, before it became the Department of Defense. The U.S. Department of the Navy was reluctant to relocate to the Pentagon, as it would reduce the physical distance, oversight, and connection with the branches of the U.S. Government.

• There were decades of debate and legal processes put in place to attempt to make defence work more effectively and efficiently in the defence of the United States, which could only take form within a unified department where all military services were considered ‘equal’.

• The eventual title, ‘Department of Defense’ (1949), represented the mindset of a wartime generation, who, considering the new technological age, believed that efforts to fight for peace were vital, where lawmakers, military and citizens alike supported the title of the new department, which clearly sent the message of ‘peace by strength in our common defense of home’.

• The U.S. Navy only supported unified defence after effectively campaigning for decades on the importance of equal Departments within a unified Department of Defense. They were later supported by U.S. Air Force who felt with the navy that any move, such as when former army General President Eisenhower attempted in the 1950s to change unified defence into an army approach in a revised ‘Department of War’ dominated organisation, would be devastating for effectiveness and efficiency. The need of a forum between the services to be able to execute their missions, roles and tasks was and is prime. The navy's view, in an effort to reduce toxic interservice rivalry, was that it was right to protect against one service overpowering or overshadowing another and equally too risky for the nation to have ‘blindness’ to strategic and tactical options of executing ‘war and peace’. Something that such ‘blindness’ would also hinder critical timely decision-making in the highest offices. Congress agreed by 1960.

In effect, calling the Department of Defense, ‘the Department of War’ could be interpreted as a retrograde step. One that is antithetical to the spirit, intent and law of unified defense, one bound Constitutionally to an army and navy, hand in hand. Rejecting over seventy years of organisational defense reform––not perfect with much right and wrong, bound up in law that would need to reversed or changed only by Congress––and equally operational experience before and during the DoD’s existence, would be a significant misstep in defence of the nation.

In short, although as innocent as some may consider a name change, the choice to call it ‘Department of Defense’ was because behind it was wisdom to send the message of effort of equal military services working together, than an image that any one service is more important than another.

Energy and effort should be directed to useful defence reform. Future debate should explore fundamental questions, rooted in sound policy and strategy, where the next steps in the journey of unified defence can take place. Reverting to a situation that, albeit only ‘sounds’ like one service dominating defense, is ignorant of the seabed to space defense of the 21^st century. Notably, a world which did not exist when the Department of War was founded as a free-standing executive branch of the U.S Government.

Please look out for extended outputs on this topic in the near future.

Please read the original article as published on July 22, 2025 on the Centre of Maritime Strategy webpages here:

https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/navies-are-our-guide-for-space-strategy/

Space is an ocean—not metaphorically, but conceptually and operationally. The cosmic frontier has always been militarised but experience in it remains limited compared to other domains like the land and sea. Although the study of orbit and outer space, along with aspirations to explore and use it were formulated long ago in tandem with human exploration of Planet Earth and the changing face of warfare, that lack of experience has led to questions on what models, if any, could be used to guide the future use of space, particularly for defence. Yet, the most applicable––navies and maritime strategy––was often rejected in favour of more tactically minded land-based doctrine, which now, as space has become more complex and competitive, is running out of headroom to be able to resolve these issues. Debates covering topics such as space strategy and space warfare have spiralled into an abyss of guesswork, theory, assumptions and a sprinkling of sensationalism, in which history warns us that such approaches are a dangerous path to navigate.

The term ‘ocean’ conjures the image not only the Earth’s interconnected body of salt water, covering approximately 72 percent of the planet’s surface, but also of any vast and seemingly limitless expanse. From antiquity, human societies have perceived a profound connection between the seas and outer space. Post-Second World War interest in space was driven by the paranoia and division that sprang forth from world-destroying inventions like the atomic bomb and the Cold War. Space is interweaved with defence, relations between nations and cultures and the progress of our civilisation in areas such as science and trade long before the rocket or aircraft. During the age of exploration, navigators turned to the stars as guideposts across the unknown maritime expanse. Science fiction writers past and present—serving as speculative architects of the future—invoked the term “ocean space” to describe the cosmos, envisioning its traversal by “space ships”. Gene Roddenberry (1921-1991), the creator of Star Trek, accurately captured this maritime sensibility by structuring the Starship Enterprise and ‘Starfleet’ as a naval vessel and organisation in both hierarchy and function.1 He was neither the first nor the last to do so and it cannot be overlooked that in the analysis of science fiction, a naval philosophy dwarfs any other.

However, in the real world it is land-based air forces—not navies—that have taken the lead in space on behalf of national governments, setting the prevailing conventions along land-based air power models and air force conventions rather than naval and maritime ones with often hostility to joint-thinking. The term ‘aeronautical’, a reminder of the common connection between air and nautical traditions has often been ditched by the most ardent ideologically driven air power theorists. Meanwhile, the high operational tempo of navies since the end of the Second World War, and pressing questions on the future influence of seapower, has meant that navies could not be as focused on space operations as they should have been. Sometimes, naval public relations devalued their relationship with space and science, a long-standing connection, while missing its potency to educate about navies.

While aerospace forces have an impressive track record in space, leaving the domain entirely to air force operatives was not the right call across operations, policy and doctrine. The reality is that in the long run particularly as closer integration of seabed through space domains is needed, space will require broad input operationally but also how we think about its influence and use rather than any single dominating viewpoint. This has become more apparent as a problem as the intensity of civilian and military events in space has picked up pace. Probing debates public and professional about space power and space warfare shows a trend that leads to an uncomfortable reality: much of policy and doctrine by national governments sits predominately on ideas rooted in little more than guesswork and assumption. This is dangerous and can mean there can be no other option to look elsewhere to models that provide useful insight, such as maritime strategy and naval operations.

For anyone seriously considering these issues and the integration of all domains—from the seabed to space and digital—into a cohesive whole––a national strategy––there should be concern that nations often place trust in theories that lack substantial experience to support them. To some degree, this is not a unique situation. Land and the seas have gathered operational experience before great minds could analyse that experience and turn it into understanding or educational materials for the military student or policymaker alike. Space is somewhat following this trend but does not have the deep reserve pools of experience or experimentation outside the bounds of the status quo because it had to be made useful as a domain and operationalized quickly. By contrast, land and sea warfare had centuries—if not millennia—to evolve both in terms of practice and theory. As a result, our understanding of how space works as a domain is less robust than other domains.

Great theorists like Prussian army officer Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and British naval historian and strategist Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) had more material to work with. They investigated and explored interconnected experiences, often free from the pressure of bias, operational schisms, and organisational myopias. This allowed them to create the very best guides to the past and also spark living debates on future strategy and doctrine. Similarly, Corbett would have warned that guesswork and assumptions are tantamount to chaos, and the chance of defeat grows with them. However, to think about these questions in a more strategic studies sense must be done free of influences that have various pressures on them, such as political or budgetary. Today, pressures are putting thought on defence space strategy—or more broadly, space strategy—on the back foot. The environment of today does not provide the luxury of time or thought that minds like Corbett and Clausewitz had.

That is not to say that the body of thought on space strategy has not vastly improved; increased research and publications show green shoots for the future. However, they do not match the pace at which activity in space is developing, technologically or astropolitically. This risks placing many nations at a disadvantage. The United States and its allies should not be swept into a wholly technological argument that some “space doctrinists” put forward, where the only solution to them is endless investment in equipment and the certainty of warfare. Instead, strategic thought is superior on how to manage the evolving situation in space wisely. The tough lesson in all of this is that without the intellectual backing underpinned by a broad debate, the ability to use space capabilities wisely can effectively wipe out any advantage that technology may have over a competitor.

Space, like the oceans, requires an intellectual strategic approach more akin to a game of chess. This is far superior to the blunt trauma approach of the land-based air power mafia theorists who have dominated strategic thinking since 1945 and believe that nations could bomb their way out of every foreign policy problem. History has discredited their approach. You could equally be as critical of “space warfare-ists”, “navalists”, “air power purists” and a host of other examples. This codifies the fact that a universal trend in nations is to slide away from thinking strategically, toward a pattern of mind that is less mature, rigid, and short-term. This has long been a factor in the use of space for warfare, and ultimately political aims. The fact that thought on space has predominantly been reflective of a tactical mindset, not a strategic one, should hardly be a surprise. The tactical mindset provides refuge for those who have operational responsibility to make things work, all of which serve the bigger machine of organised defence. A byproduct of the defence unification process—the creation of Defence Departments as we know them—has seen strategy devalued, which has filtered down over the decades to create organisational cultures to think more tactically, more akin to land warfare than something broader: a position diametrically opposite to the maritime mind. A true “maritime mind” holds that the term “maritime” connotes the broad spectrum and many interrelationships of interests regarding the oceans of the world such as politics, economics, science, technology, exploration, industry, trade, foreign relations, communications, law, and culture. This is little different to what is happening in space.

You can see the risk of rushing thought and thinking less strategically in the soundbites of the last decade, certainly as bureaucratic and political pressure to develop yet another armed force of the U.S. military, ––the U.S. Space Force––has taken grip. Whether creating Space Force was right or wrong will not be debated here but setting it into context is important for organisational culture shapes how it thinks, in this case now with heavily influences of the U.S. Air Force. Firstly, creating another military service was antithetical to the principal of defence unification which in base form sought closer relations between services. Secondly, the operational military lessons from the U.S. and U.K. and its allies of the first bloody half of the 20^th century pointed towards integration of services, then further division. Thirdly the advice of organisations such as National Advisory Committee of Aeronautics (NACA, 1915-1958), U.S. Navy and Royal Navy, warning that a singular model for space could lead to difficulties in funding and operations was ignored. In fact, the debate over the possible use of space strategically was a naval conversation, not an air force or army one, and it occurred over a decade prior to the start of the first space race.2 That limited debate happened at a service level on a course of action, reflected by the presumption of many that space was an air force function, should have been a warning in itself. If that debate could not be resolved or the allocation of responsibility for space placed under the Navy Department, the unified defence system, if probably working, should have forced Space Force into a distinct service in its own right. This was to safeguard space and to highlight its importance particularly from predatory tactics of service departments to bolster their budgets by grabbing missions, as had been seen countless times before during debates on defense organization. Sadly, the political motivation and financial requirements, aligned with other factors scuttled having a useful reflective period on space power and forces, which has led to this point where there are more questions than answers.

Statements such as “space is the ultimate high ground”3 simply reflect the organisational myopia in which that doctrine was created. Anyone who thinks space is ground, or that it has the high advantage, seemingly doesn’t understand physics, let alone that there is no “up or down” or “ground to hold” for that advantage. This becomes even more of a problem beyond orbit due to the vastness of space and the potential mobility of an aggressor. If anything, forcing an enemy to battle is more akin to the age of sail naval battles of old, with ships chasing one another across the oceans. An apt analogy would be as Lord Horatio Nelson (1758-1805) did in the Campaign of Trafalgar 1804/1805, which saw the British fleet corner the enemy for warfare, in which to gain strategic advantage for England, over the total annihilation of the enemy’s forces. The same could be said about the Battle of Jutland in 1916 between the Royal Navy and Imperial German Navy, whereas the destruction of Germany’s High Sea Fleet was irrelevant as long as the fleet couldn’t threaten the Royal Navy’s sea control across the globe which was vital to Britain’s survival and victory. Ultimately, the prevailing rhetoric by some is that space is the “decisive domain”4clearly has little grasp or is miseducated about the thousand years of military history in which false prophets have made numerous claims, often all weakened from their original overpromise.

As the United States faces a new epoch in space, it will require an intellectual approach to maintain an advantage rather than one of dominance. This space era is not defined by the false security of the post-Cold War era were science and exploration took to the fore, but one of exploitation, commercial competition, and potential conflict. Washington needs a coherent philosophical framework suited to the nature of the orbital domain which cannot nor should not be considered separate from the other domains. Some have argued that the best paradigm is inherently naval in origin and orientation. While this is true in many regards to the best outcome for future projection in space, particularly beyond orbit, a maritime philosophy of space, one that draws further upon nautical5 principles, institutions, and operational practices, would enable greater comprehensive integration of terrestrial, maritime, and extraterrestrial activity. Under such a framework, space operations would be conceived not as “missions” but as sustained operations similar to naval and maritime ones that have in reality gone on unendingly in some cases for decades if not centuries. This emphasis would shift from individualistic, land-based, inspired approaches to spaceflight toward collaborative systems reflective of both naval and air traditions, prioritising cohesion, continuity, and strategic reach.

Crucially, it is now more vital to treat space not as a discrete or exceptional environment, but as part of a continuous operational spectrum extending from the seabed to orbital altitudes and beyond—a multidimensional theater in which human presence, mobility, adaptability, and sustainability must be assured over extended periods. Adopting a maritime strategic posture is not merely rhetorical. The U.S. Navy’s and once Royal Navy’s, enduring imperative to ‘command the seas’ is ultimately grounded in its ability to shape outcomes ashore. The naval tradition of joint operations—particularly in concert with the Marine Corps and the Army—demonstrates a longstanding capacity to coordinate integrated actions across the domains of land, sea, and air. Arguably, expeditionary and special forces operations competencies embedded within a maritime mindset offer a logical model for sustained space deployments, applicable for both peacetime presence and potential conflict scenarios. In this light, space operations, particularly those concerned with security and deterrence, should be approached with a similarly holistic mindset.

By considering space through the lens of a maritime philosophy, it provides the safeguard against the marginalization of critical space functions to all services, ensuring they remain integral within broader operational concepts rather than becoming siloed or deprioritized as defence budgets remain under scrutiny and the United States sees the gap between wishes and priorities widen.

Space is not a mere extension of any one domain. It is best understood as an oceanic expanse, complex, vast, and strategically vital in its own right and locally to Earth. As in oceans, it is navies that decide outcomes when it comes to peace and war. If we are to genuinely continue to claim responsibility for the process of evolving strategy in the “western tradition”, it is not a strategy for “space”, “air”, “land”, “sea” and “digital”, but quite literally a national strategy of “seabed to space”.

Dr. James W.E. Smith is the Laughton-Corbett Research Fellow at King’s College London. In 2021, James completed a 15-year study examining the relationship between the higher organisation of defence and national strategy-making in the U.K. and the U.S. As a result of that work, James was additionally commissioned to explore the future of defence and civilian space strategy by the British Academy, King’s College London and working with support from civilian space agencies and various navies from around the globe.

In the August 2025 edition of Warships International Fleet Review, (on sale in e-version and print in the UK & abroad after 18 July 2025) I analyse the recently published UK 2025 Defence Review document. I continue to advance the argument 'strategy is dead' and defence organisation isn't working

The full article is available in print and e-print. The publishers website is:

https://warshipsifr.com/

Please support publishing where and when you can.

My most recent publication at the Center for Maritime Strategy is titled ‘Learning from the Royal Navy: Lessons for the USN on Sea Power Politics’, published on April 29, 2025, in ‘The MOC’, the center’s online journal.

In this article, I examine the historical and strategic parallels between the United States Navy (USN) and the British Royal Navy (RN). He explores how the RN's experiences in navigating political, cultural, and institutional challenges can offer valuable insights for the USN. Dr. Smith emphasises the importance of understanding the political dimensions of sea power and the necessity for the USN to adapt its strategies in light of these lessons.

This publication continues my exploration of maritime strategy, building upon previous work, such as the November 2024 ‘To Provide and Maintain a Navy Is Not Enough: Making the Case for American Sea Power Requires More’ where I argued for a more comprehensive approach to American naval strategy beyond constitutional mandates.

For those interested in a deeper dive into Dr. Smith's analysis, the full article is available on the Center for Maritime Strategy's website.

For students and researchers:

Dr. James W.E. Smith has contributed several insightful articles to ‘The MOC’, the online journal of the Center for Maritime Strategy, focusing on the interplay between historical maritime strategies and contemporary naval challenges. His works emphasize the importance of integrating historical lessons into modern naval strategy and policy.

Key Themes in Dr. Smith’s MOC Publications

1. ‘Learning from the Royal Navy: Lessons for the USN on Sea Power Politics’

In this article, Dr. Smith examines the historical and strategic parallels between the United States Navy (USN) and the British Royal Navy (RN). He explores how the RN's experiences in navigating political, cultural, and institutional challenges can offer valuable insights for the USN. Dr. Smith emphasizes the importance of understanding the political dimensions of sea power and the necessity for the USN to adapt its strategies in light of these lessons.

2. ‘To Provide and Maintain a Navy’ Is Not Enough: Making the Case for American Sea Power Requires More’

Dr. Smith argues that the constitutional mandate to "provide and maintain a Navy" is insufficient for addressing the complexities of modern maritime challenges. He advocates for a more comprehensive approach to American naval strategy that goes beyond constitutional mandates, emphasizing the need for a robust and adaptable maritime strategy informed by historical precedent and strategic foresight.

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Dr. Smith's contributions to ‘The MOC’ underscore the necessity of integrating historical maritime wisdom into current naval strategy and policy. By drawing parallels between past and present, he provides a nuanced perspective on the challenges facing modern navies and the strategic imperatives required to address them.

In the May 2025 edition of Warships International Fleet Review, (on sale in e-version and print in the UK & abroad after 22 April 2025) I consider a ‘revolution’ (a very unbritish word!) that is, ironically, needed to return the UK to the ‘British Way of War and Peace’.

The full article is available in print and e-print. The publishers website is:

https://warshipsifr.com/

Please support publishing where and when you can.

The 2024 King’s Impact Report highlights research by King’s academics that, based on feedback from sources such as governments and lawmakers, has made a global impact and is considered a top priority today and tomorrow. The report features British Academy-supported Dr James WE Smith’s research that focuses on advancing education and understanding of strategy and how it can help overcome issues like policy and public blindness towards domains like the sea and space.

Governments and lawmakers need to have informed debate to develop defence and foreign policy, while those they represent – the public – struggle to connect with places alien and hostile to human existence which significantly shape those matters. At the heart of this is the reality that our environment shapes our lives. The place of least interaction for most – the sea and space – do so daily. From the seabed, where raw resources and the bulk of digital data flow, advance national economies, to the oceans where ships move the goods and resources civilisation depends on, to space that influences everything below it, everything works in a fragile concerto of technology and human exertion to keep our civilisation functioning. This is an inheritance for all, where human endeavour, innovation, exploration and much more work together, often in a less than perfect manner. Nonetheless, it does work to provide the global commons in which decision-making and directions can be taken – locally, nationally or internationally – on every sector and activity humans engage in.

Looking Beyond the Horizon

Humans tend to focus on the here and now, while looking to the past and future with curiosity, trepidation and some suspicion. There is a tendency to focus on day-to-day activities where individuals set importance on the perception of their immediate needs. This rarely results in a spare thought as to what is beyond the horizon, coastline or far above them. While those interested in the world around us and how it functions understand this concerto, the fact that it does work only serves to push what happens at sea and in space far from most people's minds until it goes wrong. In these moments, what happens on the oceans or in space usually comes to the forefront of people’s minds, particularly as it usually involves economics, defence, technology and relations between nations.

When questions are asked about pressing economic matters, military operations, or delicate foreign relations, poor education often either exposes or leads to blindness on various issues in policy. These weaknesses can be purposefully prised open by adversaries and those with ill agendas or, through a series of missteps, delay addressing problems. This obscurity often pertains to what happens on the sea and in space and their impact on national life, along with the interaction between these crucial domains and the activities of the nation. Most are not to blame for this as it goes beyond a mere matter of literacy and reflects the particular geography of a nation where debate occurs. For example, the sea is non-negotiable to an island like Britain, while in other countries like the United States the drive for superiority in space to achieve global reach may take precedence. Humans have had to purposefully set out to develop machines and technology-enabling pathways to make these domains useful. In the process, they have developed skills, defeated challenges and made theoretical ideas practical. That is because neither the sea nor space is humans' natural habitat. We cannot naturally survive there, and unlike air, which is a transitory area, we do things with sea and space vital to the success of our species. In their own way, they provide security, which people depend upon, whether logistically, such as raw resources to power homes and businesses or to defend against adversaries’ actions.

Educating on Strategy

Understanding these domains requires special and continuous effort. Advancing understanding requires ever-present education, which in itself is based on the only thing it can be: experience. This is because guesswork, assumptions and weak theories with little supporting substance are useless to inform those who make policy, design strategies, debate laws and execute doctrine. This is because the price of failure at such a level can often be disastrous. Instead, using the best tools at our fingertips is a superior way to address the task. Studying history – but with a view to applying the wisdom and insight that can be gained from it – will always provide sound foundations. This enables nations to refresh debates, ideas, and policies for the times we face by using that guidance in discussion forums.

To help maximise usefulness and understanding of the sea and space in the many-faceted parts of national enterprise requires strategy. This is because a national strategy, where all the levers of a nation – military and civilian – must work together, can be brought to bear to achieve national objectives. Often, this is not the case and is more of a phenomenon in recent decades of policy-making than it was in previous centuries. What happens at sea and in space is not a self-contained history, nor is strategy a self-contained history of ideas; they continuously and reciprocally influence the world around us. The use of both today results from complex and often non-linear processes and experiences, that shape nations, cultures and human interactions. These interactions may function as unity but – in the worst cases – can lead to tension, conflict and war. Elsewhere, military power requires strategy bound in timeless principles, and all the components from all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber–must work together towards a common goal. However, blindness to sea and space will provide nothing more than a clear path to defeat. Not understanding the importance of internet stability, the adequate flow of resources, the support of power grids or the value of intelligence – all of which are crucial to military and diplomatic efforts – ultimately stunts a nation’s ability to make and execute informed choices.

Navigating the Oceanscape of Policy-Making

In attempting to navigate the choppy waters of the 21st century, it is helpful first to recognise that the challenges faced are little different to all recorded history; turmoil is a status quo and often has deep roots. ‘Peacetime’ and nothing happening would be the end of history and is out of step with the trend of humankind, at least for now. Today we see, from the Indo-Pacific through to Europe with the Ukraine-Russia invasion, a complex interweaving of history, culture, politics, economics and more where the sea and space bear influence across the civilian and military spectrum. How we think about these domains and the process of understanding their role will either aid resolving questions and problems or hinder them, particularly if they are used to effectiveness by those with different agendas. Modern warfare and diplomacy are full of complexities influenced by seabed through to space and by the realm of cyber and artificial intelligence. We must look to a comprehensive strategy rather than a selective approach. This is not an easy process, but history shows that understanding the relationship between land and sea, armies and navies, has been crucial, and that educating decision-makers on these dynamics is crucial to empowering national discourse and the process of strategic thinking.

In short, the seas and space matter. Although, through time, their influence and usefulness have been questioned, misunderstood or even manipulated, they cannot and should not be ignored. For blindness in policy or strategy, both military and civilian, will always exist. It can be combatted and tempered, but never wholly defeated, but the success of that task ultimately rests on the education of decision-makers and the public alike because international order and national security rest on seabed to space strategy.

Original link: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/education-and-understanding-the-strategy-for-sea-and-space, 31 March 2025

With thanks to King’s College London for asking me to write this article where I expanded on the King’s Impact Research Report.