Let them read complex strategic studies scholarship: they'll flourish.
Don't hold new generations back out of misguided concern to what they want to learn about strategic studies and applied history. Arm them with the skills for the future.
I've been told that the young generation of military officers starting their training or civilians entering the workplace in government defence roles must be kept away or even discouraged from so-called 'complex' history and strategic studies works. This is not to say they do not study it, but scholarship and historical texts which may be considered for late-career or even 'in their spare time' (should they get any) are less likely to join the reading lists of the courses or discussed in the professional classroom. This is a stark difference from the BA War Studies course at King's College London, where exposing the student's mind early to War Studies texts, regardless of the complexity, is vital to the student's success in the long term. However, the argument is that the education system or PME1must provide a baseline for the student to understand these works, or at least a class in the methodology behind them––such as the applied history school––before they can appreciate these works. I think the potential ‘shielding’ of younger minds or the idea of a gentle uphill, step-by-step approach may be underestimating those minds, particularly those who have chosen a military career and could likely disadvantage them later on.
Rightfully, there is only so much that can be cramped into the training curriculum of military personnel, and many students or officers want to be actually 'getting on with the job,' but what happens when they are thrust into arguments that require the skills that only the study of humanities provide? Is the only option to crush mid to late career to bring them up to specification to understand issues like strategy and policy when their time is divided between a great many tasks and responsibilities along with that operational experience and organisational culture that often shapes minds to be less receptive to new ideas or ways of thought? Plenty of debates exist on the shape and scope of that education and lifelong education during the career of military and defence civilians. These debates often rotate around the time spent on, the broadly termed 'technical' versus anything else, depending on their chosen branch or career path. As demonstrated when seapower and maritime strategy was best understood by the nation, rightfully, the priority was to develop the best naval professionals (In the case of Britain, because Britain needed the best as it could not afford failure at sea) to do the task at sea than be concerned about other matters. However, in the past, education early or mid-career placed the humanities and ‘technical’ complimentary to one another. This helped develop what, with the advantage of hindsight, some of the best civilian and military minds that nations could offer. The argument that the military is more technical now than ever and, therefore, the humanities must be squeezed out is usually demonstrated by those who education failed them to point out the irony in their statement: the military has always been technical since at least the arrival of the Longbow if not before and always will be. They managed to juggle these pulls on the education of personnel before so why not now?
In the case of Britain, even though it depended on the Admiralty and civilians2for most of the Royal Navy's history than naval officers to understand and recommunicate national strategic realities, they were never wholly cut from the equation. For example, courses in the early 1900s at Greenwich Naval College exposed mid to late career civilian and naval officers to the very cutting-edge of research and civilian scholars who were using the very best contemporary applied history methodology for topics such as strategy and policy. However, the outcome of degrading humanities in education was clear, and along with the creation of unified defence, naval officers were forced to take on more of the 'work-load' in Whitehall than they had ever been exposed to. They were woefully underprepared for the task as a result in cutting of that education including staff work training. In the United States, which did not have arguments like being an Island to fall back on, it was established early, particularly with the founding of the US Naval War College in 1884 and even the structure of the US Naval Academy, that there was more in the education of officers than just at the time, hard graft or leadership, or today, the logic of the silicon mainboard in a missile system. Although education was never perfect, and arguably even the most senior authority in the US Navy, such as CNO Ernest J King, felt education never prepared him for the decision-making and other duties like engaging with Congress,3 the attitude was never to constrain what texts students were exposed to, often quite the opposite.
So, why not give government civilians and military personnel a greater chance later in their careers by catching them at the start? The cost and time to educate about strategy and applied history is relatively tiny in defence budgets, and there is plenty on offer by civilian establishments: the argument there isn't time is an excuse and demonstrates an active choice based on ignorance rather than a rational standpoint. This increasingly looks as a short-term versus long-term investment argument. The intricacies of the education curriculum are not the focus of my commentary today, but rather the attitude towards which texts should expose minds to concepts, culture and applied history. Why shouldn't curious minds be exposed to the key texts and the latest works? Indeed, saying: “They are too hard”, is underestimating, demoralising, and holding back those minds and new generations? Give them the challenge.
I'd suggest the opposite tack. First, do not hold back applied history and strategic studies to civilians and military personnel closest to the topic; in fact, make it compulsory. Second, early or mid-career do not make the critical texts from great historians such as Clausewitz, Corbett, and Mahan or newer works such as Heuser4 as something on the reading list or optional. A good example might be how Andrew Lambert's British Way of War5 is considered too complex for the early or mid-career military officer. Nonsense, give all of them a copy engaged on the relevant course. It's when in the classroom they come back with questions we can see the gaps in education to be resolved and that is the place to have a debate about the material, which only increases understanding not takes away from it.
On the other hand, it is the place for scholars such as myself, and some do, such as Heuser and Lambert, who try their best to make in-depth analyses which are based on original evidence to make their work accessible to the civilian and military mind alike just as those they study did in times gone by: old is not irrelevant. Debate on the specifics is for the scholars and academics involved in the academy to have spaces to do it, should they exist, and is of little concern to most in defence. More important is that they have access to the outputs like The British Way of War in the first place. Much of the major works on strategy, their authors saw as living documents for generations to build on, again, a task for these scholars to work on but also to consider how that output can be useful to professionals in defence, military or civilian. An audience who culturally are inclined to want ‘full stops’ to work than open ends.
I'd hazard an informed guess many minds will only flourish by being given access to texts such as these. They will at least serve as counterbalances to rigid, dogmatic approaches reinforced by organisational culture, where 'there is only one way or the highway'. It is that kind of approach which is more a threat to defence and policy-making than exposing minds to a range of scholarship, no matter the complexity. Afterall it cannot be a bad thing for the forum of debated needed in defence where civilian and military professional alike has the skills and education to constructively read and analyse arguments for defence and security for today and tomorrow.
Private Military Education, such as Britannia Royal Naval College or the US Naval Academy.
See, Kohnen, David. King's Navy: Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and the Rise of American Sea Power, 1897–1947.
Heuser, Beatrice. The Evolution of Strategy.
Lambert, Andrew. The British Way of War, Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy.