Please read the original article as published on July 22, 2025 on the Centre of Maritime Strategy webpages here:
https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/navies-are-our-guide-for-space-strategy/
Space is an ocean—not metaphorically, but conceptually and operationally. The cosmic frontier has always been militarised but experience in it remains limited compared to other domains like the land and sea. Although the study of orbit and outer space, along with aspirations to explore and use it were formulated long ago in tandem with human exploration of Planet Earth and the changing face of warfare, that lack of experience has led to questions on what models, if any, could be used to guide the future use of space, particularly for defence. Yet, the most applicable––navies and maritime strategy––was often rejected in favour of more tactically minded land-based doctrine, which now, as space has become more complex and competitive, is running out of headroom to be able to resolve these issues. Debates covering topics such as space strategy and space warfare have spiralled into an abyss of guesswork, theory, assumptions and a sprinkling of sensationalism, in which history warns us that such approaches are a dangerous path to navigate.
The term ‘ocean’ conjures the image not only the Earth’s interconnected body of salt water, covering approximately 72 percent of the planet’s surface, but also of any vast and seemingly limitless expanse. From antiquity, human societies have perceived a profound connection between the seas and outer space. Post-Second World War interest in space was driven by the paranoia and division that sprang forth from world-destroying inventions like the atomic bomb and the Cold War. Space is interweaved with defence, relations between nations and cultures and the progress of our civilisation in areas such as science and trade long before the rocket or aircraft. During the age of exploration, navigators turned to the stars as guideposts across the unknown maritime expanse. Science fiction writers past and present—serving as speculative architects of the future—invoked the term “ocean space” to describe the cosmos, envisioning its traversal by “space ships”. Gene Roddenberry (1921-1991), the creator of Star Trek, accurately captured this maritime sensibility by structuring the Starship Enterprise and ‘Starfleet’ as a naval vessel and organisation in both hierarchy and function.1 He was neither the first nor the last to do so and it cannot be overlooked that in the analysis of science fiction, a naval philosophy dwarfs any other.
However, in the real world it is land-based air forces—not navies—that have taken the lead in space on behalf of national governments, setting the prevailing conventions along land-based air power models and air force conventions rather than naval and maritime ones with often hostility to joint-thinking. The term ‘aeronautical’, a reminder of the common connection between air and nautical traditions has often been ditched by the most ardent ideologically driven air power theorists. Meanwhile, the high operational tempo of navies since the end of the Second World War, and pressing questions on the future influence of seapower, has meant that navies could not be as focused on space operations as they should have been. Sometimes, naval public relations devalued their relationship with space and science, a long-standing connection, while missing its potency to educate about navies.
While aerospace forces have an impressive track record in space, leaving the domain entirely to air force operatives was not the right call across operations, policy and doctrine. The reality is that in the long run particularly as closer integration of seabed through space domains is needed, space will require broad input operationally but also how we think about its influence and use rather than any single dominating viewpoint. This has become more apparent as a problem as the intensity of civilian and military events in space has picked up pace. Probing debates public and professional about space power and space warfare shows a trend that leads to an uncomfortable reality: much of policy and doctrine by national governments sits predominately on ideas rooted in little more than guesswork and assumption. This is dangerous and can mean there can be no other option to look elsewhere to models that provide useful insight, such as maritime strategy and naval operations.
For anyone seriously considering these issues and the integration of all domains—from the seabed to space and digital—into a cohesive whole––a national strategy––there should be concern that nations often place trust in theories that lack substantial experience to support them. To some degree, this is not a unique situation. Land and the seas have gathered operational experience before great minds could analyse that experience and turn it into understanding or educational materials for the military student or policymaker alike. Space is somewhat following this trend but does not have the deep reserve pools of experience or experimentation outside the bounds of the status quo because it had to be made useful as a domain and operationalized quickly. By contrast, land and sea warfare had centuries—if not millennia—to evolve both in terms of practice and theory. As a result, our understanding of how space works as a domain is less robust than other domains.
Great theorists like Prussian army officer Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) and British naval historian and strategist Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) had more material to work with. They investigated and explored interconnected experiences, often free from the pressure of bias, operational schisms, and organisational myopias. This allowed them to create the very best guides to the past and also spark living debates on future strategy and doctrine. Similarly, Corbett would have warned that guesswork and assumptions are tantamount to chaos, and the chance of defeat grows with them. However, to think about these questions in a more strategic studies sense must be done free of influences that have various pressures on them, such as political or budgetary. Today, pressures are putting thought on defence space strategy—or more broadly, space strategy—on the back foot. The environment of today does not provide the luxury of time or thought that minds like Corbett and Clausewitz had.
That is not to say that the body of thought on space strategy has not vastly improved; increased research and publications show green shoots for the future. However, they do not match the pace at which activity in space is developing, technologically or astropolitically. This risks placing many nations at a disadvantage. The United States and its allies should not be swept into a wholly technological argument that some “space doctrinists” put forward, where the only solution to them is endless investment in equipment and the certainty of warfare. Instead, strategic thought is superior on how to manage the evolving situation in space wisely. The tough lesson in all of this is that without the intellectual backing underpinned by a broad debate, the ability to use space capabilities wisely can effectively wipe out any advantage that technology may have over a competitor.
Space, like the oceans, requires an intellectual strategic approach more akin to a game of chess. This is far superior to the blunt trauma approach of the land-based air power mafia theorists who have dominated strategic thinking since 1945 and believe that nations could bomb their way out of every foreign policy problem. History has discredited their approach. You could equally be as critical of “space warfare-ists”, “navalists”, “air power purists” and a host of other examples. This codifies the fact that a universal trend in nations is to slide away from thinking strategically, toward a pattern of mind that is less mature, rigid, and short-term. This has long been a factor in the use of space for warfare, and ultimately political aims. The fact that thought on space has predominantly been reflective of a tactical mindset, not a strategic one, should hardly be a surprise. The tactical mindset provides refuge for those who have operational responsibility to make things work, all of which serve the bigger machine of organised defence. A byproduct of the defence unification process—the creation of Defence Departments as we know them—has seen strategy devalued, which has filtered down over the decades to create organisational cultures to think more tactically, more akin to land warfare than something broader: a position diametrically opposite to the maritime mind. A true “maritime mind” holds that the term “maritime” connotes the broad spectrum and many interrelationships of interests regarding the oceans of the world such as politics, economics, science, technology, exploration, industry, trade, foreign relations, communications, law, and culture. This is little different to what is happening in space.
You can see the risk of rushing thought and thinking less strategically in the soundbites of the last decade, certainly as bureaucratic and political pressure to develop yet another armed force of the U.S. military, ––the U.S. Space Force––has taken grip. Whether creating Space Force was right or wrong will not be debated here but setting it into context is important for organisational culture shapes how it thinks, in this case now with heavily influences of the U.S. Air Force. Firstly, creating another military service was antithetical to the principal of defence unification which in base form sought closer relations between services. Secondly, the operational military lessons from the U.S. and U.K. and its allies of the first bloody half of the 20th century pointed towards integration of services, then further division. Thirdly the advice of organisations such as National Advisory Committee of Aeronautics (NACA, 1915-1958), U.S. Navy and Royal Navy, warning that a singular model for space could lead to difficulties in funding and operations was ignored. In fact, the debate over the possible use of space strategically was a naval conversation, not an air force or army one, and it occurred over a decade prior to the start of the first space race.2 That limited debate happened at a service level on a course of action, reflected by the presumption of many that space was an air force function, should have been a warning in itself. If that debate could not be resolved or the allocation of responsibility for space placed under the Navy Department, the unified defence system, if probably working, should have forced Space Force into a distinct service in its own right. This was to safeguard space and to highlight its importance particularly from predatory tactics of service departments to bolster their budgets by grabbing missions, as had been seen countless times before during debates on defense organization. Sadly, the political motivation and financial requirements, aligned with other factors scuttled having a useful reflective period on space power and forces, which has led to this point where there are more questions than answers.
Statements such as “space is the ultimate high ground”3 simply reflect the organisational myopia in which that doctrine was created. Anyone who thinks space is ground, or that it has the high advantage, seemingly doesn’t understand physics, let alone that there is no “up or down” or “ground to hold” for that advantage. This becomes even more of a problem beyond orbit due to the vastness of space and the potential mobility of an aggressor. If anything, forcing an enemy to battle is more akin to the age of sail naval battles of old, with ships chasing one another across the oceans. An apt analogy would be as Lord Horatio Nelson (1758-1805) did in the Campaign of Trafalgar 1804/1805, which saw the British fleet corner the enemy for warfare, in which to gain strategic advantage for England, over the total annihilation of the enemy’s forces. The same could be said about the Battle of Jutland in 1916 between the Royal Navy and Imperial German Navy, whereas the destruction of Germany’s High Sea Fleet was irrelevant as long as the fleet couldn’t threaten the Royal Navy’s sea control across the globe which was vital to Britain’s survival and victory. Ultimately, the prevailing rhetoric by some is that space is the “decisive domain”4clearly has little grasp or is miseducated about the thousand years of military history in which false prophets have made numerous claims, often all weakened from their original overpromise.
As the United States faces a new epoch in space, it will require an intellectual approach to maintain an advantage rather than one of dominance. This space era is not defined by the false security of the post-Cold War era were science and exploration took to the fore, but one of exploitation, commercial competition, and potential conflict. Washington needs a coherent philosophical framework suited to the nature of the orbital domain which cannot nor should not be considered separate from the other domains. Some have argued that the best paradigm is inherently naval in origin and orientation. While this is true in many regards to the best outcome for future projection in space, particularly beyond orbit, a maritime philosophy of space, one that draws further upon nautical5 principles, institutions, and operational practices, would enable greater comprehensive integration of terrestrial, maritime, and extraterrestrial activity. Under such a framework, space operations would be conceived not as “missions” but as sustained operations similar to naval and maritime ones that have in reality gone on unendingly in some cases for decades if not centuries. This emphasis would shift from individualistic, land-based, inspired approaches to spaceflight toward collaborative systems reflective of both naval and air traditions, prioritising cohesion, continuity, and strategic reach.
Crucially, it is now more vital to treat space not as a discrete or exceptional environment, but as part of a continuous operational spectrum extending from the seabed to orbital altitudes and beyond—a multidimensional theater in which human presence, mobility, adaptability, and sustainability must be assured over extended periods. Adopting a maritime strategic posture is not merely rhetorical. The U.S. Navy’s and once Royal Navy’s, enduring imperative to ‘command the seas’ is ultimately grounded in its ability to shape outcomes ashore. The naval tradition of joint operations—particularly in concert with the Marine Corps and the Army—demonstrates a longstanding capacity to coordinate integrated actions across the domains of land, sea, and air. Arguably, expeditionary and special forces operations competencies embedded within a maritime mindset offer a logical model for sustained space deployments, applicable for both peacetime presence and potential conflict scenarios. In this light, space operations, particularly those concerned with security and deterrence, should be approached with a similarly holistic mindset.
By considering space through the lens of a maritime philosophy, it provides the safeguard against the marginalization of critical space functions to all services, ensuring they remain integral within broader operational concepts rather than becoming siloed or deprioritized as defence budgets remain under scrutiny and the United States sees the gap between wishes and priorities widen.
Space is not a mere extension of any one domain. It is best understood as an oceanic expanse, complex, vast, and strategically vital in its own right and locally to Earth. As in oceans, it is navies that decide outcomes when it comes to peace and war. If we are to genuinely continue to claim responsibility for the process of evolving strategy in the “western tradition”, it is not a strategy for “space”, “air”, “land”, “sea” and “digital”, but quite literally a national strategy of “seabed to space”.
Dr. James W.E. Smith is the Laughton-Corbett Research Fellow at King’s College London. In 2021, James completed a 15-year study examining the relationship between the higher organisation of defence and national strategy-making in the U.K. and the U.S. As a result of that work, James was additionally commissioned to explore the future of defence and civilian space strategy by the British Academy, King’s College London and working with support from civilian space agencies and various navies from around the globe.
See, Kohnen David, King’s Navy: Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and the Rise of American Sea Power, 1897–1947.
See Smith, James WE, The Foundations of Future Space Strategy: The Admiralty, US Navy and Maritime Influences (2023).
https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/ussf/publication/spfh1-1/spfh1-1.pdf
ibid.
Note the term ‘aeronautical’.