The American Sea Power Paradox: Why the US is More Naval Than Maritime
America's strength at sea isn't organic, inherent, or easily projected—making the oscillating fate of the USN a logical progression.
In short, I revisit some arguments in my PhD and forthcoming title:
The myth of an American maritime “spirit”
The notion of an organic American maritime “spirit” is largely misrepresentative. Why?
This stems from a persistent assumption—also deeply flawed in much American naval thinking—that the United States can develop maritime argumentation through naval power alone and be by default a maritime nation. The concept implies some intrinsic capacity to be and think maritime, something few nations possess. Island states have relative advantages here; continental powers are often inherently skeptical or even hostile to the sea as they can retreat to land and have core security [food and fuel] without dependency on the sea, irrelevant of the prosperity that trade and more, that the oceanic forums enable for better or worse, which is a secondary matter.
American naval ambition is reactive, not organic.
American naval ambition hasn’t been spontaneous. It followed specific impetus:
Beating the British and not just at war.
These are two different navies, and although the Royal Navy became subservient to the USN in the 20th century, the USN was never going to ‘best’ the RN in culture or spiritually because they exist for different reasons.
Securing recognition of the US as maturing global power.
Waging total war.
Supporting American foreign policy objectives an era of super power and great power competition.
This isn’t an organic maritime spirit. Most of the time, American sea power has been a naval response to a naval question. This is far from an integrated maritime nation where every component—legal, inland seaways, business, enterprise, shipbuilding, naval, and more—aligns with culture, to work together. Shipbuilding has to be competitive globally, maritime products edgy, mariners trained and international laws influenced, rather than blindly accepted particularly when they tilt against good order at sea, if not against the ‘West’. The age of a happy world at sea, and trust of equals at sea through legal cooperation at sea that Britain and America wanted that came out of the Second World War, is dead, if not a fallacy either nation told itself in the first place.
In the past, America has been a maritime nation, but it is far from it today. Simply put, the concept of America is maritime nation and always has been is disingenuous to the truth and undermines the ability to think clearly about America’s navy and a broader American maritime future let alone a strategy of how the sea is going to influence what happens next. To be blunt, those peddling this myth, are part of the problem. Equally, teaching naval personnel–midshipman to Admiral–and civilians that America is a maritime nation or ‘inherently so’, isn’t helping the situation because they are effectively being duped into a false sense of security rather than being equipped to communicate who they are and what they are for. Education on the sea is a constant task, civilian and military must always be addressing it.
Attempts are underway, but actions, not just assertions, will determine whether a return happens at all, is short lived or longer lasting and this means uncertainty. Achieving true maritime national status requires vast support and significant investment across multiple fronts. It can’t resort to island arguments. This is which why in America naval matters get priority over maritime and civilian, but to be a maritime nation, this imbalance can’t last. It is also something that has accelerated the switch back from America being a maritime nation to a nation with a vast Prussian style tactical naval force.
The shifting dynamics at sea—real competition—notably—suggest America’s naval advantage may be retreating, though this could itself generate impetus. It’s not the first time this has happened and plenty examples exist over the 19th and 20th century. Equally, consider the US Navy’s rebuilt strength after Pearl Harbor: astonishing resilience when pressed against the figurative seawall. Could America do it again? Afterall American naval ambition and enterprise, was something a wise Japanese Admiral observed and knew Imperial Japan’s fate was sealed by pretending to be a fake land power. An irony, the Royal Navy’s post-imperial decline directly corresponds to the biggest disaster in British defence: becoming continental minded and a fake land power. For American’s this is all you need to know why the Royal Navy is as weak as it is and how Britain discarded hundreds of years of institutional memory and corporate experience in one of the best national strategy’s the world has seen.1
But returning to America, it is critical to acknowledge, the naval advantage at sea was eroded largely from within the Western framework than outside pressure. Let us not permit those responsible for much of these outcomes escape accountability and equally, all the strain for keeping the peace at sea, or worse, fall entirely on the USN’s shoulders. Where are the other navies that were once part of great and powerful seagoing alliance?
Federal coordination to be a maritime nation remains theoretically possible, but it is also an all American enterprise right across the nation, though bureaucracy—often the genuine adversary of effective maritime and national strategy—will likely sabotage implementation. The deeper reality demands more than rhetoric; it requires sustained political commitment to rethinking America’s relationship with the seas with the USN just part of a picture, not the whole. Yes American navalists, this isn’t all about you and your shopping lists for naval procurement.
This framing obscures a deeper reality. As a continental nation, America has always required deliberate, sustained effort to be both a naval power and maritime power. US historical performance suggests oscillating fall and decline isn’t speculative but somewhat inevitable—making defensive navigation far more critical than patriotic assumptions about inherent seagoing competence in the minds of decisions-makers and lawmakers, let alone the US citizen: who has to fund it.
The core problem: Refusal to accept reality
The real issue remains that Americans refuse to accept a fundamental truth: its relationship with the seas has been “rather up and down,” and the Navy’s fate has often reflected those fluctuations. This volatility is somewhat natural for a vast landmass.
But the “sentimental drivel” of claiming America is a maritime nation—let alone that ghostly spirits of the past will easily carry forth to new glorious heights? That’s nothing more than navalism and misguided pride dressing up genuine difficulty in articulating what the US Navy actually needs or should do. It’s perfectly natural for a nation like the US to struggle with this, and that’s precisely why navalism itself exists but equally why navalism won’t go far enough to address it.
Until many acknowledge this, change will be reluctant and incomplete. It’s always been hard for America to be a sea power—it’s tough, grueling work that requires constant effort on multiple fronts. Quaint ideas and patriotic views are potent, but they cannot defeat the overarching problem. For serious strategists, this means nuance trumps nostalgia. The “maritime spirit” narrative serves more than analysis; it exposes genuine difficulty in articulating what the Navy actually needs and the interconnecting ligaments across the maritime sector and how it may survive into the future. The greatest cynic could see a future of a US Coast Guard, Army and Air Force: just as CNO King and SECDEF James Forrestal feared as they were forced to walk into the army built Pentagon building at the dawn of the defence unification era just after the Second World War having narrowly avoided the Department of War totally dominating the emerging Department of Defense….As Forrestal warned: the temptation for America and its navy to be ruled by an Army War Department, was an constant threat to American maritime power and one hard for America to resist nor dressing American naval strategy as ‘maritime strategy’ in an effort to convince America it was maritime. Cold War warriors take heed from King and Forrestal if you can bring yourself to accept this reality.
Why this refusal to see reality is particularly dangerous
To tip the scales of seablindness to disaster rather than something manageable—in island and continental nations–is usually due to lacklustre performance of continental thinking applied to the sea which infects thinking, debate and conversations towards a naval paradigm then a maritime one: distorting policy, destroying strategy and creating bigger problems for later.
Confusion steams on if America is a maritime nation from the geographic realities of America, flanked by two oceans: in short to go anywhere or do anything on mass, needs the naval and maritime component. Whereas, other nations, islands or those on continental land masses can clearly see their defence priorities: land and air together, or a maritime core to their strategy. That means Army and Air Force or, for others, a navy and expeditionary army. Either way, the culture of a continent overrides sound thinking on this, how the people feel safe, as we see in America is because of the lack of sea dependency which drives a paradox on exactly what the shape and scope of naval ambition and being maritime is.
A historical pattern
Again, many of our forebears on both sides of the Atlantic knew this. What makes this conversation urgent is its historical consistency. British and American figures from Washington, Adams, Mahan, Corbett, Sims, Knox, King, Forrestal, Burke, and others recognised these tensions, reflecting the times they operated. But today, it seems many either aren’t educated to understand it, refuse to study it, or lack the objective reality to confront it.
The narrative that America possesses an innate maritime character—from cultural DNA to strategic instinct—is widely held yet fundamentally flawed. Continental impulses will always override maritime ones in a vast land mass, like the US. Face this reality and make it the first priority, or in simple terms, fighting seablindness, and there are no limits for the US navy and the maritime sector to excel, from seabed to space.
All explained in my PhD and due to be made public in a forthcoming title.