The UK Ministry of Defence at 60

Unified Defence Trundles on as Monolithic Organisations of the Nation State

1 April 2024 marks sixty years since the UK Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) creation in the legal form we recognise today. In the abstract of my PhD, I remarked:

Defence unification was one of, if not, the defining change in British and American defence and government¹

Subsequently, I went on to prove why this statement was correct by using original evidence and records, many never seen before. I detailed, explored, and analysed the development of strategic thought and theory since the 1940s and explained the impact and influence of unified defence on both nations' national defence strategy. Although little attention is directed to the creation of the Ministry of Defence and the US Department of Defense (DoD), the final process dominated the 1940s through to the 1960s; what little is known was accepted as fact and thought to have been a process that was not nor should be questioned. The process called ‘unification’ matters because it has impacted and shaped not just the future of defence policy and strategy but also how the military, government, and civilians think about defence. This change left few areas of defence, security and intelligence untouched. Defence unification was the process in which the free-standing military departments of the state, such as the Admiralty, were abolished and replaced by a homogenised defence ministry.

Although it is not the point of this article to discuss the PhD or the creation of the MoD and DoD in detail,² I will leave that to my forthcoming book(s); it is worth reflecting on a few points.³

You’d have thought that such a fundamental change, one at the heart of national defence and foreign policy, would have been recorded, let alone understood in detail, particularly by civilians and military who serve in the establishment. This could not be further from the truth, and it is one of the driving factors that led me to address this problem in my research. The first and most crucial point is that unified defence is designed to serve civilian political power and financial control. The concept that most have today, that centralised and unified defence is about better operational performance between the military services, superior strategy and policy, or enhanced management of equipment procurement, is equally misguided. Such quaint ideas riddle the rudimentary and often very few pages of Parliamentary Hansard, the Ministry of Defence’s official account and the perception from Cabinet and the public alike of the existence of the MoD.

Meanwhile, in the United States, the creation of the DoD, although better catalogued, has relied on official histories which exempt the complex issues that lawmakers and the military struggled to grapple with at a critical moment in the history of America as it took on leadership as a superpower. In the British case, since the 1970s, many studies of the Ministry of Defence focused on addressing problems of ‘the moment’. These were often obscured under terms such as ‘reform’, where the history of unified defence was consigned to be of minor importance and repeated a well-practised hymn sheet that serves to identify few knew the truth of how the MoD was created and what it meant for matters of national importance such as national defence strategy. This was, by design, something the architects of unified defence had from the outset intended to hide, which was what occurred during the creation of MoD.

No wonder they were keen to brush under the carpet that the new system for defence was initially no sounder nor designed to address things that the flimsily and hastily assembled case to justify change on criticism of the previous system was. Many problems and issues had to be resolved by future generations through organisational ‘reform’; many remained unaddressed (some even fabricated) from when the MoD did not exist. In some cases, unified defence created a host of new issues. Ironically, many of the issues identified by those with often had separate agendas remain a problem today; therefore, the creation of defence was less than straightforward and far from the triumph some claim.   

In Britain, MoD or not, it could not escape geographic reality, financial constraints, and weak resources, which meant moving the chess pieces for the central organisation of defence and its higher organisation was akin to redressing a shop window that ultimately behind the curtains had to have the same display. The rampant vandalism in the second half of the 20th century of British defence policy rejected wisdom, understanding, analysis and execution of the bespoke way of war and peace rooted in a national maritime strategy that had developed over centuries. The common belief that the objective of superior British strategy was secured by abolishing the service ministries has no factual basis. Some politicians involved were misled or, worse, had little care other than personal ambition. The act of unified defence set defence on a path that can be recognised today, where countless reviews of defence and security demonstrate the appetite for a superior strategy from government, military and elsewhere. Yet, it has failed to produce a national answer. Ironically, this question comes from a system that produced the problem in the first place; replacing national strategic experience with ‘land-centric’ thinking, thus destroying the ability to understand how national strategy had been developed prior. The answer for a national strategy, one reflective of experience seabed to space, is not forthcoming because the process we use to think about strategy today was not designed to support that enquiry, something the Admiralty and a few others fiercely pointed out 1955-1964. Instead, the foundations of modern defence were built on a set strategic model, continental in origin and focus, utterly alien to the British experience, one that discouraged the discussion of national policy and strategy, only making the task of decision-making easier for politicians who increasingly lacked the education to understand defence and strategy. The MoD has been successful in developing land-centric thought. As a product of continentalist strategic and tactical approaches to defence, it has served this cause no end and along with it, distorted understanding of the seapower state and maritime strategy that had served Britain well.

It would be easy to criticise and congratulate unified defence simultaneously, but where would one start and stop over sixty years of British defence? As of April 2024, a host of questions could be asked about the organisation's past, present, and future based on an endless list of topics, including equipment procurement, human resources, financial management, and defence as a whole. As I stated in the PhD and opening pages of my forthcoming book, what is the benchmark for unified defence to be successful? One can argue whether or not the MoD executed the task set by the government(s). Yes. However, does the Government know any different, or does the MoD know any different about how to educate the Government? No. This not only underlines why the organisation and its creation are essential to understand because organisational culture matters as it shapes how problems and questions are approached. As unified defence has been so poorly recorded, this has resulted in a lack of interest in it, which has served to support that little institutional memory, let alone living memory of pre-unified defence or the early MoD exists. This makes it difficult for civilian and military personnel alike to find value and rationale or to possess the inclination to enquire or question a system they must make work and know no different. After all, those who serve in whatever way, have other pressing tasks. Alternatives are a matter of research and education from those outside it. We must know the past because we cannot comprehend the future without doing: defence organisation is no different.  Some may argue it is less a question of whether the Ministry of Defence should exist, but perhaps instead, it is if the current organisation is equipped to ask and answer questions that best serve the state. For example, What is the national strategy and Why? How many Armed Forces do we need? Does the higher organisation of defence provide the best forum for debate on strategy and policy? How can changing demands of the state and foreign policy be addressed by defence along with standing commitments of national defence? 

These are the questions that matter, but they are also the questions furthest from what little debate there was on creating the MoD in the first place. Unified defence was, after all, about making decision-making easier for a political class who didn’t want to expend effort asking questions when they could hand them off to bureaucrats and officials who could be called to account when it went wrong than them directly shouldering the blame but taking the credit when it was successful—balancing civil-military relations and the method and value placed on military advice similarly transformed with questionable results.   

I remarked in the PhD when I reviewed the limited literature on the history of the MoD and changes in defence strategy, policy, and organisation since 1964:

The danger of the modern military establishment, including civil service and political body to ignoring experience is because they, as a product of, only know of the unified defence organisations they have to operate. Modern joint operations, joint military education and joint command systems discourage them from considering an era, for better or worse, without unified defence or the identity, agenda and ideas of individuals who developed the systems they have to use today. Objectivity or subconscious bias become significant concerns for modern military researchers, particularly as the narrative of unification is influenced by the established heritage of centralised defence, which is itself influenced by limited views of the unification era and selected perspectives that have nothing bar criticism for the pre-unified era. Further examples to demonstrate being unable to think outside current organisational culture could include interservice rivalry or questions over service effectiveness and efficiency, which are often a critique of the service ministry era, yet is that to say this has not been an issue under unified defence? The evidence supports otherwise. In short, in addition to the problem of accessing records and misunderstanding in military circles and academia, they reflect the current reality that centralised defence, further ingrained by the growing culture of ‘jointness’, was unlikely to change – for better or worse – consequently, there could be no benefit from studying its organisational or intellectual history.⁴ Additionally, it could be that modern British and American defence became unduly attached to a particular vision that deterred them from self-reflection; discouraging questions on unification for concern that any analysis of unification would end up comparing service ministries with unified defence, caught in a situation of cultural myopia towards change forwards or back.⁵

In simpler terms, it’s hard to think of anything different or constructively critical, whether that be strategy, policy, operations or organisation, when you are drinking your own ‘cool-aid’. This underlines why research from outside the MoD and independent of it is important, for the government and Parliament must be educated about it, particularly on the most important issues like national strategy. As one past Admiralty Secretary pointed out, if you get organisations wrong, the future will be of endless reviews, change and questions which are a sign of chaos. I think great comfort can be taken in this foresight, but it also demonstrates that there is helpful wisdom within the past than taking a narrow vision that anything pre-unification is outdated. One can only look to the reviews of defence and security in ‘Western nations’ in just the 21st century to find evidence of mounting chop and change suggesting organisation is struggling to address the tasks being demanded from it. The most pernicious premise that unified defence was about better strategy should be consigned as a ‘myth’ along with the idea that Parliament ever scrutinised it properly in the first place.

It is not to say that these organisations are not scrutinised, quite the opposite and often are interweaved with the political agenda. They are not free from criticism from various outputs like journalism and an increasingly miseducated public about defence. Still, they often focus on equipment, personnel, and financial management rather than whether those questions are the right ones or avoiding a vaster mounting problem: Is this system working? Problems often have deep roots, and the MoD is no different. In the 1950s, the United States Congress saw that constantly reorganising defense nearly broke the American military at a critical time, and it was time to move on. However, it’s no coincidence that the creation of the term ‘seablindiness’⁶ appeared during a time of defence organisational reform in the UK, demonstrating the link between organisation and strategy, something I further explored in my PhD. Bar some tinkering around on both sides of the pond in the 1980s⁷ since the primary era of unified defence that defined 1941-1964; maybe it could be argued that it is time to ask critical questions again. However, as the US Congress demonstrated, it’s to weigh up the pros and cons and the timing of change, but plenty will use this as an excuse to push off even asking questions. Instead, perhaps, the question to ask is if we can afford not to revisit what unified defence means in the future…

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You can read more about the creation of the UK Ministry of Defence and the US Department of Defense and how this impacted strategy in my forthcoming titles.

1. James WE Smith “Deconstructing the Seapower State: Britain, America and Defence Unification 1945-1964,” PhD thesis., (King’s College London, 2021).

2. You can read the public abstract here: https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/studentTheses/deconstructing-the-seapower-state

3. I’ve also disseminated some of the research elsewhere such as in podcasts, articles and public lectures. Such examples include: A) Institute of Historical Research Seminar Series: Defence Unification, Strategy and Policy: 1945-1964 B) King’s College London Seminar Series: The Creation of the UK Ministry of Defence & the US Department of Defense: Power, Politics and Agenda.  A New History C) US Naval History Lecture: Two Steps from Abolition:The U.S Navy and U.S Defence Unification

4. Including terms such as ‘integration’, ‘jointery’ and ‘amalgamation’. Asserted without question of origin or rationale, whether they preclude debate, validity examined and scrutinised for agendas and bias within an organisational culture.

5. This could be also framed as a causality loop, self-fulfilling prophecy’ or ‘predestination paradox’. 

6.

7. For example, the US 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.