The US Navy versus Seablindness: par for the course for America?
America's sea power project has some uncomfortable truths at its heart.
There have been fewer times that Americans have cared about their navy than they have not. In the first half of the 20th century, it was often the opposite situation than the British, where it appeared––for right or wrong––the US Navy was in American’s mind not for what it had achieved but for what it had or had been made to look like it had done wrong. While the British felt the immense weight of history on their shoulders, where a rightful paranoia had grown in the British public’s mindset prior to 1945 that failure at sea meant certain national doom, little equivalent form of pressure existed in the United States. America’s approach to how they viewed sea power and respected their navy is no quirk, one driven as equally in a continent to that of an island nation where geographic realities have shaped culture. Similar to the British, Australian, and Japanese populations, many Americans live in close proximity to the sea; however, although perhaps not equal in number, they are counterbalanced in the United States by those who live far from it. Critically, the fact that Americans could isolate themselves where the fundamental ingredients to national survival, such as fuel, resources and food, could be provided and kept relatively secure inland––far removed from the sea––is a powerful motivator to detract from cohesive and coherent arguments for the navy. Instead, the case to understand and place value on the sea had to be made, rather than questions arising in a more natural form where interaction with the sea was a daily occurrence for many and in national projects. This point makes for a powerful argument for those who question US taxpayers' money flying out of Capitol Hill to be spent on a navy that sometimes struggled to define its role, let alone why it existed and where active anti-naval forces have existed in Congress since the start. Over time, as the US Navy grew into something useful for the Executive Branch and State Department to harness and use, it had at the same time learnt––often the hard way––the value of building its identity and relationship with the nation. This effort had to be matched simultaneously with lawmakers, all of whom had to be convinced that sea power was a useful tool and educated on its function in the apparatus of national power.
Americans have always had a love-hate relationship with their navy, as much as American navalists deny this today. Arguments for American sea power have often had to be propped up by scholars, veterans, naval officers and the few on-side politicians, the latter of whom have had to be educated by entire organisations like the US Navy League or US Naval Institute on why they should speak out. Again, this is something numerous devotees of American naval power are reluctant to admit, instead placing blind faith and burying their ‘heads in the sand’ that understanding of sea power mysteriously magics itself into being and maintains itself.
There have been methods and means to communicate why a continental country has a navy, evolving with the times since the US Army, the senior American military service, could no longer be bothered (1798) to administrate a growing force of vessels whose aspirations were initially less about becoming a navy second to none but one to bash the British. For all the American rhetoric on this, the US Navy neither had to, did, nor needed to best––whatever that meant––the Royal Navy. Such an aspiration nearly broke the US Navy: by the end of 1945, after reaching the zenith of its political influence and wartime power through its own ‘Campaign of Trafalgar’, which involved charging across the Pacific Ocean to defeat Imperial Japan in the Second World War, the misguided dependency on that aspiration was laid bare when senior naval fleet leadership visited Washington DC for debates on defence reorganisation and where voices were keen to (misguidedly) point the finger at the Navy for failings over the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. When senior naval fleet officers met with the highest authorities in DC, such as the most senior sailor of the US Navy, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Ernest J. King (1878-1956), and Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), James Forrestal (1892-1949), it was made clear that the nation, lawmakers and Executive Branch were intending and in some cases already actively moving on from what the navy had achieved and, for various factors, sea power was chiefly being considered of lesser usefulness in the future of America’s defence and foreign policy. In short, for all the effort to learn, understand and educate on how the United States could use maritime strategy and the sea to its benefit and advantage, by 1946, that effort was being thrown to the wind faster than all the mechanisms designed to combat America specific seablindness could respond to. The purposeful act to place value on sea power for the US was encapsulated when Admiral Stephen B. Luce (1827-1917) and Captain Alfred T. Mahan (1814-1914) founded the US Naval War College. It provided a sense of permeance for the study of sea power but the sea itself into American lawmakers’ minds, who would also have to fund the Naval War College in 1884.
The subsequent trials, challenges, problems and hard work by American sailors and luminaries such as historian Dudley Knox (1877-1960) over the following decades led to an era of unparalleled navalism and above-average affection towards America’s navy. It provided and supported a culture that secured prominent endorsements by Presidents, lawmakers, and Americans who both had a stake and were convinced that a navy and a maritime future for America were right. But just as Britannia’s God War, Lord Nelson was no fool to the vulnerabilities of understanding of British seapower and maritime strategy to decision-makers in London1 many American navalists before 1945 were acutely aware that forcing a quasi-seapower culture on America was far more of an enduring task than many believed and more complex to islands in which they had studied closely. There was no retreat from reality: division, discord, and confusion over questions like ‘What is America’s navy for?’ and what the sea meant for America could quickly undermine support for investment in the navy. As it had before, this encouraged counterforces and a cadre of voices who, for a continental country, were naturally inclined towards Prussian military ways of thought, if not purposefully educated towards it, such as found with many American military officers and lawmakers. There was no default fall-back argument or position for American navalists compared to that of island nation navies, which could deploy the argument of maritime dependency, thus making time an ally to remobilise and recraft sound arguments based on evidence and experience.
Debate on the US Navy and sea power is a constantly moving target, answers to crucial questions need to be kept under review and reformed for the times it operates because stagnation means gathering storm clouds for the USN in whatever form that may take, often reflecting the domestic agenda and foreign policy issues of the moment. The relative silence of the Admiralty in national politics to that of the Department of the Navy and its supporters in the post-Second World War decade symbolised this critical difference. That almost overnight support for the US Navy, or the mindset of one President––President Harry S. Truman (1884-1972)––could change towards it, demonstrated that without continual investment through education of sea power and the intellectual and cultural ‘mechanisms’ behind it than the security provided by it could be made to be irrelevant. The troubled period of 1945-1961 saw inevitable problems for a navy that had become overconfident in its position with the American people and their representatives. I explored this in “Deconstructing the Seapower State: Britain, America and Defence Unification”2, for the context and understanding of the past are vital when considering the US Navy in the 21st century, let alone, as I proved, how close the US Navy came to abolition.3 The lengthy declassification and FOIA process––which is still ongoing after a decade, made the case that study of the US Navy after 1945 is near impossible, something less so of other navies in the world (friendly or not)4––proved how King and Forrestal both warned that the message and understanding of sea power in America was always on the back foot.
The process of defense unification confirmed that Congress had to be educated with great effort, and a close bond to the Executive branch remained vital; a failure in education at any of these high offices would sufficiently provide gaps in understanding that could lead to widespread confusion on funding and use of the navy particularly as the business of the navy, like all navies, is far from the corridors of power and challenging to demonstrate their value and capabilities. King and Forrestal’s message that the navy and broader maritime domain are always on the back foot was a message that slowly evaporated. It was distorted and morphed into something less representative of their instructions because many navalists decided over time that the only solution for the US Navy was a narrower naval vision, although presented often under the illusion of maritime strategy. This vision made it dependent on an argument of sea power by threat and a navy solely for power projection, then reattempting to communicate a more cohesive widespread maritime strategy message to Capitol Hill as the case had been before 1949. The US Navy of post-1949 was different from the one that went before. If it weren’t for King and Forrestal, and other visionaries such as CNO Arleigh Burke (1901-1996), Admiral Hyman Rickover (1900-1986), along with other civilian and military personnel in the two post-Second World War decades, the future in which navalists and US naval and marine officers had to navigate would have been far more troubled. Many officers and civilians in the Navy Department found that overnight at the end of the Second World War, their task went from winning a war to reconstructing a new foundation in which to educate on the basics of what a sea power meant to a continental nation: a nation flanked by two oceans, an era of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of the transistor, later a space race and a nation thrust into a superpower role it was unsure or nervous of how to execute. The fact they had to reform and rebuild the best they could something which had only been done over a few decades prior, is what matters. It demonstrates how continuously vulnerable the US Navy is to the prevalent bias towards seablindness, which is continental countries' default mindset and underlying culture.
It may be easier for those both within and outside the United States borders to state that ‘No, America does not suffer seablindness’ because, on the surface, debates over its navy often become technocratic or demonstrate the illusion of lavish fiscal luxury that they would rather debate ‘how many ships they have’5 then why they have them at all. This only serves to mask complex realities, where in the United States, confusion often reigns over terms like ‘sea power’, ‘maritime strategy’ and ‘naval strategy’, and importantly, you’ll get a different answer in Maryland or DC, then to Rhode Island, Florida, or California and in particular those states which are landlocked to what these terms mean. It also raises the question of whether American navalists are compensating for something more profound. For a nation that once had the panache to produce intellectuals like Mahan, Knox, King, Burke, Forrestal, William S. Sims (1858-1936), William S. Pye (1880-1959), J.C Wylie (1928-1972), to name a few, they are reluctant to comprehensively visit old uncomfortable questions out of fear of where it may lead them, or perhaps equally; they are falling into the same trap that some did in the build-up to 1945 of over security of the ‘naval message’ and the level of understanding by those who make decisions which, are again, not by default maritime minded.
This would matter slightly less in a world of American isolationism, where current and former White Ensign flyers worked closer together. Still, the fact remains the world has become dependent on the US Navy as a stabilising force for good in world affairs and of good maintenance of the high-seas––of which not all agree6 and equally was about finishing off British rule of the seas in the 1940s––seemingly it makes the debate and fate of the US Navy of interest to American’s and foreigners alike. US taxpayers have a right to point out that such global dependency on the US Navy by other nations, even amongst new and old allies, is worthy of further investigation. Equally, the embarrassment for island nations who have failed to invest in their navies to become dependent on American naval power when they should be equal partners––island nation navies protecting their own customs, traditions and use of maritime power which come before continental interests, for islands are dependent on the sea––raises uncomfortable questions for them. The pertinacity of land-centric thinking, a natural mindset for humans as they do not live on the sea, afflicts continents and islands alike but is more dangerous to the latter and default for the former. That global order on the high seas be dependent on the American nation with its natural bias away from the sea and instead favours Prussian terms of land warfare should alarm other powers who have an interest in the sea, even if they happen to have been educated to at least acknowledge that chaos at sea, and the constriction of the flow of goods and resources is a fast route to conflict and war, from seabed through space.
History has shown that in the background, it isn’t a question of ‘could’ but ‘if’ America could turn its back on its navy—as it has before––or that it could lose its status as the dominant global naval power. Considering America’s partners on the seas, although Britain has betrayed its maritime connections and the necessity of national maritime strategy, Australia and Japan have not. These nation's navies working together, in some form of island nation pact, would provide a powerful ally for the US Navy while having a sufficient voice to point out that island nation seapower can and should not be held ransom to continental demands or islands who have other needs than power projection which take priority over that such as constabulary, shipping protection and regional sea control to name a few. Arguably, working closely in this form is a useful model to consider how larger enterprises like a Commonwealth Navy or Global Navy could realistically work. Yet, continents can lose interest in sea power and must often be reminded that the fundamental tenants of being a sea or maritime power, such as protecting shipping from threats, are in their interests to address and to stop world affairs from further tumbling out of control and developing into something continents will have to handle anyway. It can not be avoided that the lure of land-based armies and air forces is more suited to them. Although they may understand the advantages a navy brings, they fail to appreciate their maritime industry's close connection to economic security and performance. Loss of interest in merchant marine and civilian fleets,7 which in turn erode interest in navies, can and do subsequently open the door to competitors on the seas––civilian and military–– which also create problems for islands which have little choice but to respond.
A particular paradox for sea power in the 21st century to depend on a continental country which took inspiration from island navies and, on the other hand, has, as most Western liberal powers do in times of peace, weakened their defence posture, which opens the door to competitors on the sea that islands could not and should not have let rise but must then ask said continental country to suppress carefully.
Essential for today on American seablindness is that Americans have active voices in support of their navy through navalists, industry, academics, historians, and civilian mariners along with those legally empowered (thanks to King and Forrestal) to speak out in the form of senior naval leadership. Those leaders must be educated for the office they hold––albeit an office they hold temporarily––than the lowest rank they can attain.8 Hearing about the latest technology or buzzwords like ‘warfighting’ may interest them; however, being educated about the realities of communicating sea power in a continental country is a task before any other and one that endures any one who holds an office like that of the CNO’s. A task that the very best US naval officers have executed with skill, professionalism and precision that few other continental countries' navies leaders have mastered.9 They should be reminded that excelling in this task will make their sessions in Congress run far smoother. Compared to other countries, such as Britain, the fact that America retains some safeguards and organisations both within and outside the navy to keep a ‘living debate’ on America’s navy and sea power is a significant advantage and powerful difference, one to be cherished and looked after.10 Americans can take as warning the comparison to Britain where that debate has ended up in the hands of few commentators, prior naval officers––some whose negativity often does more damage than good––and academics who it is sometimes implied are more an annoyance to the MoD than sources of helpful knowledge––to the point all combined they might as well be called the ‘thin grey funnel line club’. America must not end up in the same situation if seablindness is to be kept at some form of bay.
In conclusion, understanding of why America has a navy or uses sea power always hangs by a thread. Although America is a continent in a position of general strategic security with its neighbours to the north and south, an argument should never be left to be made that ‘giving up the oceans’ to either side is a price worth paying should America want to remain an economic and military power in the future. A future where it needs to make full use of the spectrum of domains to its strategic advantage to protect the hard-earned way of life that it and other nations have strived for. A world with a weaker US Navy is a less stable world, something that Americans must think carefully over and navalists must be mindful of, for continental powers can pick, choose, and favour specific directions in national strategy and not necessarily maritime. Meanwhile, Americans have, and should, point out that other nations should invest more in their navies, for the strain on the American sailor and their fleet could eventually force nasty questions out into the open. However, whether or not America has a sufficient body of intellectual minds and access to the evidence to do so now or in the future, to be ready to answer and answer in a way that doesn’t resort to the comfortable technocratic debate of naval power that so often dominates its proceedings, is an open question.
The quality of that debate, the methods, the importance of the study of history, the influences upon those debates, the gatekeepers to it and bringing on new generations of civilian and military, among other factors, often make or breaks the discussion. Subsequently, the quality of debate impacts the willingness of lawmakers to listen to why America needs a relevantly configured and capable navy for the times it operates. Meanwhile, it should not be ignored that those who pay the bills for American naval power do not understand and have little patience for the difference between 250 warships and 400; instead, they want to hear how sea power offers America both security and foreign policy options. The rubric of ‘one more carrier or not reflects national prestige’ rather smacks an element of some not learning from the past of how often America loses interest in its sea power project when its better to be able to answer first ‘remind me what all this expensive stuff is for again?’…or more seriously and rightfully so for Congress to ask: ‘Isn’t this experiment in American sea power just too much and where is it going?’…
Authors note:
Although part of the PhD developed a new history of the creation of the Department of Defense and the US Navy in defense unification which was compared to the British experience, it would be a disservice to cram both narratives into a single future publication. Although there is crossover, a new history of the creation of the DoD and the US Navy is forthcoming. This will come after the British focused publication.
James WE Smith “Deconstructing the Seapower State: Britain, America and Defence Unification 1945-1964,” PhD thesis., (King’s College London, 2021).
I presented this research to American naval historians and military personnel (2017-2021). Some became rather disgruntled when presented with the facts. This kind of made the point, that without understanding and study of the past, many are doomed to repeat it.
To the point it appears the system is designed to discourage study: this can include shifting goal posts to MDR’s, FOIA and the increasingly difficulty to access archival records held in locations such as NHHC and USNWC. As others and I have argued, this is creating a massive strategic vulnerability to America and its allies to not be able to tap the low hanging fruit that is the wisdom of the past.
The following post makes the point, context for numbers of naval and maritime assets to a nation are important rather than just being a matter of ‘finger counting’ and national boasting.
Russia and China remain outspoken critics of UNCLOS.
Examples of debate and discussion but also vital public access to those debates on civilian and merchant matters are demonstrated by https://gcaptain.com/ and https://www.youtube.com/@wgowshipping amongst others.
CNO King remarked how his education was “defective” and little prepared him for the task of making decisions in high office along with the scale of the challenge that educating about sea power was to the highest levels of the Federal Government. See, page 22 of Dr David Kohnen’s book ‘King’s Navy Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King and the Rise of American Sea Power 1897–1947’, scheduled for the fall 2024 catalogue with Schiffer Publishing.
Admiral Sergey Gorshkov (1910-1988) : Architect of the Soviet Navy, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy (1956–85) being of note as an continental alternative to US naval leadership.
The UK used to have initiatives in similar form, some gave inspiration to the creation of American versions. That America retrained theirs again reflects on the poor state of maritime and naval thought in the UK. See, James WE Smith “Deconstructing the Seapower State: Britain, America and Defence Unification 1945-1964,” PhD thesis.